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What happens when the state changes the default rules that govern financial 
obligations between unmarried partners from opt in to opt out? Most states have an 
opt-in rule: unmarried partners do not take on financial obligations of one another 
unless they agree to do so with a contract. Nevertheless, advocates argue that an 
opt-out system puts the burden in the right place: unmarried couples who want to 
avoid default obligations should bear the burden of making contracts. A scholarly 
debate over the opt-in/opt-out model has raged for twenty years, but the issue is now 
coming to a head. Yet no research, until now, examines the actual impact of opt-out 
rules on affected couples.  
This Article offers a new analysis based on an original qualitative study with 
interviews of thirty unmarried couples in an opt-out jurisdiction. The study reveals 
that most cohabiting couples do not know that the law considers them spouses. For 
those who know, either they do not realize that they can opt out, or they face 
difficulties trying to do so. Moreover, if couples do not opt out, the terms of the 
default contract the state imposes are not particularly popular—only about half of 
interviewees would have chosen these terms if they had thought to bargain. Further 
complicating things, the research shows that sometimes the opt-out law has an 
expressive effect: it communicates values of conjugality and commitment. Using this 
data, and relying on contractual theories, this Article contends that the opt-out 
scheme is choice-decreasing because it makes defaults highly sticky. Yet, contrary 
to the traditionalist view, an opt-out approach does not undermine the institution of 
marriage. Instead, this approach aligns with the neoliberal ambition to shift 
dependency-related responsibilities from the state to the family. Finally, this Article 
proposes that for opt-out regimes to avoid mimicking the problems of opt-in 
schemes, defaults must be better known to couples, be better tailored to diverse 
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The skyrocketing number of people who live in nonmarital relationships 
in the United States presents daunting, yet vital, regulatory challenges. 
Noting “the record number of unmarried cohabitants in the United States . . . 
and the need for greater clarity and predictability in the law governing 
cohabitants’ economic rights,” the Uniform Law Commission recently 
appointed a Drafting Committee on Economic Rights of Unmarried Couples 
to create a model law.1 Scholarship on the topic, which has grown in recent 
years, is greatly divided about what legal resolution is optimal but in 
agreement it poses one of the most challenging contemporary regulatory 
questions.2  
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1 Submission to Committee on Scope and Program: Proposal for Study Committee to Explore 
Feasibility of Uniform Law Governing Economic Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants, UNIF. L. COMM’N 
(2016), https://www.uniformlaws.org/viewdocument/joint-jeb-proposal-for-study-
commit?CommunityKey=\1e989ea5-ad22-4777-9805-cb5f14cae658&tab=librarydocuments (last visited 
Feb. 8, 2020). In December 2016, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Family Law and the Joint 
Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts submitted a proposal to the Uniform Law Commission 
to form a committee to study the “feasibility of a uniform act governing the economic rights of unmarried 
cohabitants.” Id. The proposal was accepted, and a drafting committee was formed in 2018. Economic 
Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants Committee, UNIF. L. COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committ
ees/community-home?CommunityKey=5f044999-b4b3-458a-b6d4-d984885d913b (last visited Feb. 8, 2020).  
2 See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Flexible Family in Three Dimensions, 28 L. & INEQ. 291, 291 
(2010) (“One of the central questions facing American family law throughout the last quarter century, 
and continuing today, is how to respond to the ‘extraordinary growth in the rate of nonmarital 
cohabitation.’”) (internal citation omitted); Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal 
Structure for Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 174 (2015) (arguing that “[t]he shift toward 
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One approach that looms large in discussions as a potential reform is 
adopting an “opt-out” scheme.3 Under such a regime, the state treats 
unmarried couples that meet certain criteria, upon breakup, as owing the 
same obligations to one another as married couples unless they deliberately 
contract out of those obligations. A version of an opt-out scheme already 
operates in Washington and Nevada, and the American Law Institute (ALI) 
endorsed it in 2002.4 If adopted in more jurisdictions, an opt-out scheme 
could affect millions of unmarried couples who will face the burden of 
opting out if they do not want to assume marital obligations (if they even 
know about the law and understand it is possible to opt out). 
Notwithstanding the consequences of such a regime, scholarship examining 
the real-life operation of an opt-out scheme and its effects is barely existent. 
This Article presents the first research that uses an empirical qualitative 
method—specifically, interviews with unmarried couples who live in an opt-
out jurisdiction—combined with theoretical analysis to inquire into how an 
opt-out regime affects cohabiting couples’ lives.5  
The stakes are high, and the regulatory terrain is complex. Without 
appropriate legal recognition, partners at the end of non-formalized 
relationships have found themselves without rights against the other 
regarding property or spousal support, even when they are functionally 
similar to couples protected by matrimonial property legislation.6 
Conversely, when recognition is overinclusive—that is, when the state casts 
 
the nonmarital family is the most important challenge facing family law today, . . . . Yet existing literature 
does not adequately address this phenomenon.”).  
3 An opt-out approach, sometimes referred to as a “de-facto marriage” or “status-based” approach, 
is specifically mentioned in the foundational documents of the Drafting Committee on Economic Rights 
of Unmarried Couples as one of the primary existing approaches that the Committee will consider. See 
UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4. See infra Section I.A for arguments in favor of and against an opt-
out approach; see also Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 
1042 (2018) (“[T]he status approach has found favor with influential legal scholars.”).  
4 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 4.09–
4.10, 5.04, 6.04–6.06 (AM. L. INST. 2002) [hereafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. For discussion about the states 
that have adopted a version of an opt-out regime, see Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 
B.C. L. REV. 1, 16–18 (2017) (“A limited number of states—two—apply the rules regulating property 
distribution at divorce to the end of a nonmarital relationship. They are Nevada and Washington, and 
both apply the rules ‘by analogy’ only.”) (internal citation omitted).  
5 William Eskridge noted the need to produce empirical data before an evaluation of the desirability 
of an opt-out approach. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime 
of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1985 (2012) (“In my view, 
cohabitation regimes ought not mimic marriage, contrary to the ALI’s Principles and the views of many 
scholars. . . . Because these ideas have not been subject to empirical testing, they ought to remain 
preliminary . . . .”).  
6 See, e.g., Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2038–39 
(2017) (“[D]efining choice narrowly poses the risk that partners will be able to avoid obligations to each 
other or improperly enrich themselves at the state’s expense.”).  Albertina Antognini, Against Nonmarital 
Exceptionalism, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 1894 n.7 (2018). See also infra Section I.A (discussing the 
multiple interests in regulation of informal relationships).  
 
2021] COMPULSORY CONJUGALITY 59 
 
 
its net too widely—it can frustrate couples’ expectations and preferences.7 
Further, crafting a customized regulation is a challenging task because 
informal cohabitation is a heterogeneous practice—meaning that couples 
refrain from marrying for different reasons and adopt various commitment 
levels—thus, a one-size-fits-all strategy is likely to fit some while being 
detrimental to others.8  
Due to these complications, and despite an urgent need to adjust 
legislation, most jurisdictions in the United States have declined to adopt 
reforms and still rely on a contractual opt-in approach that has proven itself 
inadequate in protecting unmarried partners.9 Conversely, in recent years, 
some jurisdictions worldwide (notably Australia and some Canadian 
provinces) have moved from the traditional opt-in approach to an opt-out 
regime.10 In an opt-out system, couples are married by default. This 
approach’s presumed advantages are that it promotes certainty about what 
the law is, minimizes litigation, and values functions over formalities. 
Further, this scheme supposedly protects the economically vulnerable 
party—typically the partner who performs a large share of unpaid 
carework.11 Scholarship in the United States and elsewhere has long debated 
the wisdom of an opt-out approach.12 In a nutshell, the traditionalist response 
contends that equating unmarried relationships to marriage would lead to a 
decline in marriages and confusion about what each legal institution 
entails.13 Conversely, the functional approach supports an opt-out scheme, 
deeming it consistent with the law’s objectives of protecting couples’ 
 
7  See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1305 (2014) (noting the 
critique against an opt-out regime “for being too inclusive because it may impose marital obligations on 
people who may be uninterested in taking on such obligations.”).  
8 See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2016) 
(concluding that decisions about how to structure the law governing nonmarital relationships should be 
taken seriously and should consider the “full continuum of nonmarital relationships”); Wendy D. 
Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Measuring and Modeling Cohabitation: New Perspectives from 
Qualitative Data, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 989, 995 (2005) (finding that 53% of survey “respondents 
did not describe the process of cohabitation as a deliberate decision.”). 
9 See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Autonomy in the Family, 66 UCLA L. REV. 912, 926 (2019) 
(“Marvin removed the barrier that prevented nonmarital cohabitants from asserting claims that other 
nonspouses could assert. But . . . the default rule that applies to nonmarital partners is one of no sharing.”); 
infra Section I.B (discussing the drawbacks of an opt-in approach).  
10 See Lawrence W. Waggoner, With Marriage on the Decline and Cohabitation on the Rise, What 
About Marital Rights for Unmarried Partners?, 41 ACTEC L.J. 49, 82 nn.155–56 (2015) (citing 
legislation recognizing marital rights in Australia and Canada, respectively). 
11 See generally id. at 50–56 (discussing the shifting marital trends in the United States and the need 
for reform should those trends persist); infra Section I.A.  
12 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and the 
Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 295 (2015) (“Many contemporary 
scholars and policy advocates challenge the privileged status of marriage, arguing that the state should 
recognize and support other family relationships.”).  
13 See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of 
Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 857 (2005) (arguing that an opt-out regime “discourages 
marital commitment and investment” and “devalues marriage”).  
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dependency and contribution to the relationship. Further, it recognizes 
relationships based on family members’ roles, rather than on formalities like 
marriage or contract.14  
This Article intervenes in this debate by providing the first empirical 
findings on the effects that an opt-out regime has on informal relationships. 
In 2013, following the promulgation of the Family Law Act (“FLA”), the 
province of British Columbia (“BC”) in Canada became one of the only 
jurisdictions globally to adopt an opt-out approach.15 Five years after the 
FLA’s enactment, I used couples’ experience in BC as a real-world 
laboratory to evaluate the effectiveness, shortcomings, and strengths of an 
opt-out approach, as well as the ways unmarried couples navigate this 
regime. To this end, I interviewed thirty couples (urban, middle-class 
individuals aged 21–48) who moved in together after the law was already in 
effect. I examined couples’ knowledge and understanding of laws 
concerning their mutual obligations and how such laws influenced their 
decisions about moving in together and negotiating mutual obligations. I 
also asked about the kinds of obstacles couples face when they wish to opt 
out, why they remain unmarried, how they divide housework labor, how 
they construe their household finances, their plans for the future, and more.16 
I used their responses to analyze whether the law fulfills its objectives and 
whether it is a majoritarian default, as well as to assess the expressive 
function of the law—meaning, the law’s interplay between reflecting 
couples’ norms of commitment and mutual support and sending a statement 
about the importance of such norms.  
Overall, the research raises significant doubt about whether an opt-out 
approach—as construed in BC and by analogy elsewhere—is the panacea 
for the regulatory conundrum of nonmarriage.17 The interviews revealed that 
couples barely know or understand the law, experience difficulties in opting 
out, and exhibit cognitive biases and overoptimism in discussing financial 
obligations.18 These barriers to opting out suggest an opt-out approach, in 
effect, creates mandatory-like rules. In contractual terminology, the defaults 
are “super-sticky.”19 The upshot is that the “choice” to opt out from the 
 
14 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 5 (2008) (Proposing a functional approach, according to which there would 
be no bright-line rule for the division of benefits and protections by the state. Instead, the law’s protection 
of the familial unit would be distributed by the purpose of the law at stake and the function the family 
members fulfill).  
15 Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25 (Can.). 
16 See infra Part II for discussion of methodology.  
17 My conclusion is not exclusive to BC’s scheme, as the barriers I found are ubiquitous in all 
common-law systems that rely on contractual principles to establish and ascertain legal obligations 
among unmarried partners. See infra Section III.B. 
18 See infra Section III.A (describing and analyzing the responses of participants in the study). 
19 See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (explaining that “[i]n settings where these [transaction] costs are high, parties 
might find themselves ‘stuck’ in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer.”); see also infra 
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default becomes all but illusory. The system’s reliance on contractual 
instruments means that most couples subscribe to (or find themselves 
abiding by) the default rules in lieu of an affirmative undertaking or, in some 
cases, even without tacit consent. 
Despite this, an argument can be made that the default rules are still 
justified if they are majoritarian (representing what the majority of couples 
would have bargained for had they foreseen the need).20 Surprisingly, for 
this research sample, the defaults of equal division of property and 
obligations for spousal support mimic the expectations and practices of 
approximately half of the interviewees.21 In particular, the defaults do not 
reflect the lives of interviewees not yet ready to commit to the relationship 
or those with lower incomes than most others in the sample. 
Making things more complicated is the observation that the law, when 
it is known to the couples, also promotes conjugality (marriage-like 
behavior) by communicating a norm of commitment and mutual 
responsibility between the partners.22 It is thus difficult to distinguish 
couples’ attitudes toward the default rules and the way they structure the 
economics of their household from the way the law shapes their expectations 
in the first place. The interviews reveal how the law’s expressive aspect 
helps some partners to justify and, sometimes, defend their legal entitlement 
to the same protections that spouses receive.  
Taken all together—barriers to opting out, non-majoritarian, and the 
law’s effect on the couples’ expectations—an opt-out approach has the 
potential to make conjugality virtually compulsory. In operation, it does not 
advance the functional recognition of interdependency. Rather, it makes 
most couples de facto married, creating a status that risks dishonoring their 
preferences or actual behaviors. Furthermore, while an opt-out regime might 
help the partner with the primary caregiving responsibilities(most often, 
women), it can be detrimental to women with low income and wealth who 
might abstain from marriage purposely to avoid a partner’s debt.23  
The interviews also alleviate traditionalism’s concern that an opt-out 
regime will undermine marriage.24 Approximately half of the participants 
 
Section III.B (analyzing the ascriptive features of default rules).  
20 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majoritarian vs. Minoritarian Defaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
1591, 1592–93 (1999) (positing that majoritarian default rules are designed to reflect the presumed choice 
of the majority of relevant bargainers).  
21 This is a smaller majoritarian default than I expected, especially considering that couples in early 
adulthood are in the prime period for accumulating assets and creating strong emotional ties with their 
partners; further, sociological studies contend that cohabitants and married couples often share similar 
characteristics in terms of their financial behavior and expectations. See infra Section III.C.1 (discussing 
sociological data about cohabiting couples’ attitudes toward the law and their patterns of economic 
interdependency).  
22 See infra Section III.D.  
23 See infra Section IV.A, pp. 47–49 (analyzing how an opt-out approach has the potential to support 
and to harm the primary caregiver in the household). 
24 See infra Section IV.B.  
 
62 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
still wanted to get married at a later point, although the law already 
recognizes them as spouses. Others, who do not want to get married, 
expressed reasons that are external to the law.25 Hence, an opt-out regime 
does not undermine marriage. Moreover, an opt-out approach actually 
advances neoliberal values that some conservatives emphasize. The scheme 
significantly increases the number of couples subject to the same obligations 
as married couples and, hence, intensifies the private support obligations. 
Doing so further privatizes dependency and support, thus obviating the 
state’s collective responsibility regarding such vulnerability and shifting 
responsibility onto private individuals.26  
This research should be of interest to scholars and lawmakers in the 
United States and globally. The Hague Conference on Private International 
Law has recently placed “cohabitation outside marriage” as one of its 
primary current legislative topics.27 BC is an excellent terrain to examine the 
operation of an opt-out approach. Indeed, the Canadian model served as a 
primary inspiration to the ALI Principles and the scholarship supporting it.28  
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the demographic 
changes in relationship patterns in the United States and across various 
nations and the challenges they pose for regulation. It describes the major 
debates concerning opt-in and opt-out mechanisms. Part II details the study’s 
objectives and the methodology used, and it canvasses some of the study’s 
limitations. Part III analyzes the responses of interviewees. It uses 
contractual, economic, and sociological theories to understand how couples 
operate in this system. Part IV then develops a critique of both functional 
and traditionalist approaches to the opt-out regime. The Conclusion offers 
some initial proposals about a system that might overcome the problems in 
an opt-out regime or make opt-out regimes less ascriptive.  
I. THE CHALLENGES AND THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES 
Before explaining the methods and analyzing the results, it is imperative 
to understand the regulatory regime governing the obligations of unmarried 
couples and the dilemmas it poses. Section A provides data about the 
 
25 See infra Sections IV.B, IV.C. 
26 See infra Section IV.C (describing the ways in which an opt-out regime promotes privatization 
of dependency).  
27 Responses to the 2016 Questionnaire on Private International Law Issues Relating to 
Cohabitation Outside Marriage (Including Registered Partnerships), HAGUE CONF. ON PRIV. INT’L L., 
https://www.hcch.net/en/projects/legislative-projects/cohabitation/responses (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
28 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at 34 (“In its operative provisions, Chapter 6 draws inspiration 
from Canada . . . .”). See, e.g., Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less: The ALI Domestic 
Partner Principles are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 353, 354 (2004) 
(comparing “American developments . . . with those in Canada, where little difference exists in the legal 
treatment of spouses and cohabiting same-sex and opposite-sex couples.”); CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, 
UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 186–93 (2010) (relying on the Canadian model as 
inspiration for an opt-out proposal).  
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demographic changes in family structure that make the legal regulation of 
partners in informal relationships a pressing matter. It also analyzes the 
challenges to regulation. Section B discusses the strengths and shortcomings 
of the opt-in and opt-out approaches. It further elucidates what is unknown 
about an opt-out model’s operation and the importance of continued study.  
A. Regulating is Hard to Do 
Addressing unmarried couples’ legal needs has been a critical and 
charged issue in family law over the past forty years.29 Since the 1980s, in 
many industrial nations, the number of people living in nonmarital unions 
has grown steeply and consistently.30 In the United States, approximately 
nine million couples live in informal conjugal relationships, almost a 30% 
increase from 2007.31 In Canada, over 3.7 million individuals live in 
nonmarital relationships.32 In 2016, over 20% of all couples lived in 
informal cohabitation—more than three times the proportion in 1981.33 In 
the United Kingdom, 3.2 million couples live in nonmarital unions, making 
cohabitation the country’s fastest-growing family type.34 The decline of 
marriage rates also translates into a reduction in the number of married 
parents. In the United States, 25% of parents who reside with children are 
unmarried.35 In 2011, in Canada, 45% of women in unmarried relationships 
had at least one child at home.36  
This demographic change in the number of unmarried couples who 
cohabit raises formidable regulatory dilemmas. In many countries—
although to differing degrees—the legal recognition of marriage and of 
 
29 Anne Sanders, Cohabitants in Private Law: Trust, Frustration and Unjust Enrichment in 
England, Germany and Canada, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 629, 630–31 (2013).  
30 See BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 97–99 (reporting the increase of cohabitants from the 1960s to 
2000s in the United States); Waggoner, supra note 10, at 51–55 (noting the decline in marriage rates and 
increase in cohabitations in the United States).  
31 See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 3, at 1016 (“Unmarried cohabitants—over 18 million of them—
now make up 7.1% of the adult population.”); Renee Stepler, Number of U.S. Adults Cohabiting with a 
Partner Continues to Rise, Especially Among Those 50 and Older, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 6, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/06/number-of-u-s-adults-cohabiting-with-a-partner-
continues-to-rise-especially-among-those-50-and-older/ (“Since 2007, the number of cohabiting adults 
ages 50 and older grew by 75%.”). 
32 Estimates of Population as of July 1st, By Marital Status or Legal Marital Status, Age and Sex, 
STAT. CAN., https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1710006001 (last modified July 29, 
2020). 
33 Families, Households and Marital Status: Key Results from the 2016 Census, STAT. CAN. (Aug. 
2, 2017), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/170802/dq170802a-eng.htm. 
34 Families and Households in the UK: 2015, OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/families/bulletins/f
amiliesandhouseholds/2015-11-05. 
35 Gretchen Livingston, The Changing Profile of Unmarried Parents, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 25, 
2018), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2018/04/25/the-changing-profile-of-unmarried-parents/. 
36 Anne Milan, Families and Living Arrangements, in WOMEN IN CANADA: A GENDER-BASED 
STATISTICAL REPORT 11 (2015), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-503-x/2015001/article/14235-eng.htm.  
 
64 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
marriage-like relationships has profound legal effects.37 In the United States, 
more than in other countries, the federal and state governments distribute 
numerous benefits via marriage.38 Marital status establishes default and 
mandatory obligations between the partners themselves and sets of 
entitlements and rights between the spouses and third parties, particularly 
the state.39 Though few default rules are mandatory, states establish default 
obligations on the partners vis-à-vis one another, both during and, primarily, 
at the end of relationships (e.g., financial support during relationships, equal 
division of property upon breakup, elective share in inheritance).40  
Similarly, legal recognition is relevant for various state-sanctioned 
purposes such as tax benefits and penalties, health benefits, immigration 
privileges, preferential treatment of pension plans, and the power to make 
healthcare decisions when the partner is incapacitated.41 The large number 
of legal effects attendant to marriage (or marriage-like relationships) is not 
entirely surprising. A primary purpose of state recognition of intimate 
partnerships is the ability to rely on “an off-the-rack rule to structure certain 
relations between members of the couple and third parties.”42 Put differently, 
one of the main modern functions of the legal recognition of relationships is 
to provide a simple way to designate an intimate partner for various legal 
purposes that arise as a result of mutual commitment and interdependence, 
without the need to execute contracts, wills, powers of attorney, or other 
forms of affirmative selection.43  
 
37 I use “legal effects” as acknowledgment that recognized relationships have different legal 
consequences across various legal contexts, forms, and fora. See Janet Halley, Behind the Law of 
Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND 1, 44–49, 53 (2010) (proposing 
“[s]eeing marriage as its effects” instead of a status or contract). 
38 See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Black Marriage, White People, Red Herrings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 977, 
996–97 (2013) (“In the United States, less marriage equals greater familial instability because marriage 
is the social safety net—or at the very least, the means by which we patch what is left of the disintegrating 
social safety net.”).  
39 See Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and Countermarriage, 99 CALIF. L. 
REV. 235, 258 (2011) (“The ‘privileges or obligations of marriage’ are vast.”); Halley, supra note 37, at 
49–50 (listing the legal attributes of marriage); see also L. COMM’N OF CAN., BEYOND CONJUGALITY: 
RECOGNIZING AND SUPPORTING CLOSE PERSONAL ADULT RELATIONSHIPS 115–17 (2001), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1720747 (describing the legal organization of 
personal relationships in Canada).  
40 See Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c I-160 (Can.) (holding a person liable for the debt of their 
spouse, in the case of a property transfer between them); Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage”: 
Reconsidering the Duty of Support and Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 12–16 (2003) (discussing 
the duty of support and services within marriage).  
41 See, e.g., Emens, supra note 39, at 258 (listing the “benefits and burdens” that state and federal 
laws bestow upon married couples); Halley, supra note 39, at 49–50 (listing the legal attributes of 
marriage); Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, S.C. 2000, c 12 (Can.) (extending benefits 
and obligations of spouses to all couples who cohabitate for at least one year). 
42 Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1783 (2005). 
43 See Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 618 (2013) (“Thus, when the 
state does not rely solely on contracts but offers an opt-in scheme as well, the government is not intruding 
into people’s lives but, instead, giving people a better means of regulating the legal implications of their 
relationships.”). 
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Because of the many attributes connected to marriage, when informal 
relationships are unrecognized, some couples are likely to suffer harms, both 
financial and dignitary.44 Without legal recognition, nonmarried partners at 
the end of their relationships have found themselves deprived of property 
rights (even when the parties’ joint effort helped accumulate wealth), 
without spousal support, or both.45 As Clare Huntington explains, “courts 
treat unmarried cohabitants as separate economic units, with claims for 
spousal support possible but rarely granted and property typically retained 
by whoever paid for it.”46 Lack of legal recognition also means denying a 
host of benefits and rights the state and other third parties distribute through 
marriage or other recognized relationships (such as civil unions, where they 
exist).47 The harm is also dignitary, as nonrecognition may stigmatize 
unmarried couples—casting their relationships as “inferior” to formally 
recognized ones.48 Although it is clear that some relationships flourish 
outside the auspices of the law, the mere denial of legal recognition might 
send a message that unmarried partnerships are “lesser” than other types of 
relationships.49  
 
44 When looking at the economic and cultural harms of nonrecognition, I build on Nancy Fraser’s 
well-known work that conceptualizes both elements as “folk paradigms of justice.” NANCY FRASER & 
AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION? A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 11 (Joel 
Golb, James Ingram, & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003) (emphasis omitted); see also Aloni, supra note 7, 
at 1300–02 (describing the harm of nonrecognition as “economic injustice and dignitary-cultural harm”).  
45 See Aloni, supra note 43, at 589–90 (noting instances when nonmarried partners purchase 
property together, but upon death or separation, only one of them retains property rights); Winifred 
Holland, Intimate Relationships in the New Millennium: The Assimilation of Marriage and 
Cohabitation?, 17 CAN. J. FAM. L. 114, 127–28 (2000) (observing that historically, cohabitants in Canada 
were “excluded from the rights and obligations which attached automatically to marriage”); BOWMAN, 
supra note 28, at 38–52 (explaining the inadequacy of equitable and contractual remedies).  
46 Huntington, supra note 2 at 178. 
47 See L. COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 39, at 120–21 (noting legal consequences stemming from 
the lack of legal recognition); POLIKOFF, supra note 14, at 123–35 (observing that same-sex couples that 
are not recognized as married are excluded from legal benefits).  
48 The stigma of being unmarried has declined significantly over the years. In 2012, a national 
survey in the United States found that 55% of participants stated that getting married is not an important 
experience to become an adult, while only 12% stated that getting married is “extremely important.” 
JONATHAN VESPA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING ECONOMICS AND DEMOGRAPHICS OF YOUNG 
ADULTHOOD: 1975–2016 4 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p20-579.pdf.  
49 For discussions of the complexities of legally recognizing friendships, see Katherine M. 
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2703 (2008) (“[T]he rules, the norms, and the 
social field of friendship are developed beyond the scope and even interest of law.”); ETHAN J. LEIB, 
FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 
2 (2011) (suggesting some regulation of friendships would be beneficial but acknowledging that most 
people think “that friendship is a special part of our private spheres that the public sphere of the law can’t 
touch”). Laura Rosenbury argues that nonrecognition of nonconjugal relationships—in particular, 
friendships—adversely affects women by preserving the traditional division of carework. Laura A. 
Rosenbury, Friends With Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007).  
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At the same time, in a world in which informal relationships are facilely 
recognized as legally equivalent to marriage, individuals are likely, as well, 
to suffer injuries regarding their finances and their dignity and autonomy.50 
A partner who might want to protect herself from an untrusted companion 
or the responsibility for her partner’s debt, or a couple who departs from 
conventional marital sharing norms, might find themselves married against 
their will.51 Legal recognition can also be financially detrimental: when the 
state ascribes marital status to unmarried couples to calculate eligibility for 
state-sponsored financial support, this might result in disqualification for 
welfare benefits, loans, subsidized housing, Medicaid, etc.52 Further, 
prescribing marital obligations between couples serves as a mechanism to 
shift the responsibility of supporting individuals in times of economic 
hardship from the state onto needy couples.53 Overinclusiveness in 
recognition, then, raises a set of challenges too.  
Legal nonrecognition versus broad ascribed recognition—the two 
binaries of the regulatory conundrum— exemplifies a tension between over- 
and under-inclusive policies.54 A policy that triggers state recognition too 
effortlessly risks misclassification and thus being over-inclusive. Such 
policy is likely to assign marital status arbitrarily and imprecisely, casting a 
wide net that captures individuals who purposely aimed to avoid recognition 
and relationships that do not fit the economic and emotional interdependence 
patterns that the state aims to capture in matrimonial legislation. Conversely, 
an underinclusive approach—one that rules out too many relationships as 
undeserving of state recognition—is likely to exclude relationships that 
merit the state’s protection.    
Making the regulatory terrain even more challenging is the lack of 
 
50 Cf. Carbone & Cahn, supra note 8, at 108–09 (“Today, however, nonmarriage has emerged as a 
choice; one that exists for couples who want to create their own relationships on their own terms.”).  
51 See Robert Leckey, Strange Bedfellows, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 641, 652–53 (2014) (asking whether 
a Canadian case that “distinguish[ed] between de facto and de jure spouses embod[ied] prejudice or 
stereotype”); Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal 
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1569 (2009) (arguing for “a liberal-pluralist case against 
equalizing the mutual obligations of cohabitants and married partners”). 
52 See Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, supra note 7, at 1320–22 (“[L]iving with an unrelated adult 
may change eligibility for welfare because in-kind assistance is calculated in determining eligibility.”); 
Lois Harder, The State and the Friendships of the Nation: The Case of Nonconjugal Relationships in the 
United States and Canada, 34 SIGNS 633, 649 (2009) (noting that the “Canadian welfare state” 
recognizes common-law relationships as marriage); Robert Leckey & Yann Favier, Cohabitation’s 
Boundaries and the Confines of Tradition, 25 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 525, 533 (2016) (observing the 
relationship between welfare benefits and the private law of family). 
53 See Courtney G. Joslin, Family Support and Supporting Families, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 
153, 168–69 (2015) (analyzing the “family-based obligations from the distribution of family-based 
subsidies”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 
966–69 (2016) (asserting that privatization of supports is “the essence of family law—a goal that 
animates the field and runs through its different elements”).  
54 See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1689–90 (1976) (“[A] general rule will be more over- and underinclusive than a 
particular rule.”).  
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formalities, which renders the task of determining couples’ intentions 
“unpredictable and haphazard.”55 For one, most unmarried couples do not 
follow formalities, such as executing contracts.56 Although married couples 
comply with legal formalities in the solemnization process, when it comes 
to other formalities, such as contracts, married couples are also notoriously 
bad in entering into ante- or postnuptial contracts.57 In the absence of 
formalities, discerning the couples’ intentions becomes a daunting challenge 
to administrators and courts.58 Further, even relying on formalities alone 
cannot serve as a satisfying mechanism, for the presence of formalities might 
indicate the couple’s intention at one point in time—and such intention could 
later change.59 Formalities might also indicate an intention that is different 
from what couples actually performed or wished.60 Finally, in some 
circumstances, overriding the couples’ undertaking (even if expressed in 
formal documents) is justified either because of the process by which the 
parties executed their instruments (e.g., duress or nondisclosure) or because 
the undertaking will lead, or has led, to unconscionable results.61 Hence, 
even in the presence of formalities, there is no guarantee that authorized 
institutions will enforce the couple’s private agreement.   
B. Two Imperfect Approaches 
In some countries (the United States and England are the paradigm 
cases), laws pertaining to unmarried cohabiting couples have frozen; these 
laws struggle to keep pace with the countries’ demographic changes and 
regulatory predicaments.62 In other places, primarily through legislative 
 
55 Robert Leckey, Judging in Marriage’s Shadow, 26 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 25, 30 (2018).  
56 See Ira Mark Ellman, “Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1365, 1367–70 (2001) (“[D]ecades of urging by contract enthusiasts have led few couples (married or 
unmarried) to make express contracts at all, much less comprehensive contracts intended to capture what 
their relationship is all about.”); Erez Aloni, The Puzzle of Family Law Pluralism, 39 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 317, 355 (2016) (“[U]nmarried partners often do not think in contractual terms and do not have 
sufficient understanding of the rules surrounding legal obligations between unmarried partners.”). 
57 In any event, as Matsumura explains, even a marriage license does not end the recognition 
problem, in terms of ascertaining partners’ intentions and interdependency, because getting married 
might be too easy and does not reflect deeper obligations that some states require vis-à-vis public benefits 
and privileges. Matsumura, supra note 6, at 2013–15. 
58 See id. at 2012–13 (discussing the benefits of relying on formalities and the difficulties associated 
with ascertaining intentions in informal relationships). 
59 See id. at 2045 (discussing the possible changing views of spouses on their relationships). 
60 See id. at 2048–50 (discussing cases in which formalities do not reflect a partner’s subjective 
intentions to accept financial obligations toward the other). 
61 See Aloni, supra note 56, at 348 (discussing procedural and substantive doctrines that enable 
courts to set aside familial contracts). 
62 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 2, at 239 (“By continuing to apply a system of law that is 
designed for marital families, the state is undermining the shaky bonds in nonmarital families . . . .”).  
In 2007, the Law Commission for England and Wales issued a report about cohabitation, stating 
that current law “ignores cohabitants altogether” and “is complex, uncertain, expensive to rely on and, 
as it was not designed for family circumstances, often gives rise to outcomes that are unjust.” L. COMM’N 
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reform processes, related laws have been amended to respond to societies’ 
changing demographics and the inequities that needed addressing. However, 
common law jurisdictions have adopted regulatory regimes that have raised 
scholarly, policy, and political debates concerning their effectiveness and 
fairness.63 In what follows, I categorize various regulatory schemes from 
various nations into two general approaches: the traditional opt-in approach 
and the opt-out approach.  
The opt-in approach is based on contract principles or related equitable 
remedies such as unjust enrichment and constructive trust.64 In the United 
States, most states use contractual principles in adjudicating claims between 
unmarried couples, although they have some material differences in 
application.65 In 1976, the Supreme Court of California decided in Marvin 
v. Marvin, which at the time was revolutionary, that contracts touching on 
financial obligations between unmarried intimate partners do not 
categorically violate public policy and are therefore potentially 
enforceable.66 Following Marvin, all states but four have permitted couples 
to enter into cohabitation contracts that entail agreement about financial 
obligations upon future breakup, and some states have used principles of 
equitable doctrines to compensate couples for their contribution to the 
partnership, at the end of their relationships.67 The variations between the 
states’ rules of enforcement are material. For instance, some states, either by 
legislation or court decisions, require that cohabitation contracts be subject 
 
ENG. & WALES, NO. 307, COHABITATION: THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF RELATIONSHIP 
BREAKDOWN: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ¶ 1.4 (2007). Their recommendations for legal change, however, 
have not been followed. Simone Wong, Cohabitation Reform in England and Wales: Equality or Equity, 
27 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 112, 128 (2015). 
63 See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 173–220 (discussing and analyzing the regulatory models 
in England, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, France, and Sweden). 
64 See id. at 47–52 (discussing rights of unmarried partners based on contract principles); Aloni, 
supra note 43, at 587–89 (discussing the same); Robert Leckey, Cohabitants, Choice, and the Public 
Interest, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHILDREN’S AND FAMILY LAW 115, 116–17 (Elizabeth 
Brake & Lucinda Ferguson eds., 2018) (discussing how common law doctrines in England and Canada 
are used to protect unmarried couples); Antognini supra note 6, at 1921–24 (discussing contractual and 
equitable approaches in the United States). 
65 Antognini, supra note 6, at 1912 (“Jurisdictions address the end of a nonmarital relationship 
through one of three general doctrinal approaches.”).  
66 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976).  
67 Antognini, supra note 4, at 52 (reporting that the “states that do not recognize rights between 
unmarried couples are Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, and Illinois”).  
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to the terms of the statute of frauds.68 Still others—for example, New York—
enforce only express agreements.69  
In Canada, the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador follow opt-in contractual principles (including 
quasi-contracts) when it comes to the property rights of partners vis-à-vis 
each other.70 In the jurisdictions that have adopted an opt-in contractual 
approach for rights between couples, living together does not raise a 
presumption of equal distribution of properties upon breakup. Unless the 
couple has executed a contract or can show that a single partner contributed 
to the property’s appreciation or purchase, making it unfair for the other 
partner to retain the gain, the couple is not entitled to an equal division of 
property upon breakdown of the relationship.71 However, in various 
contexts, the Canadian federal government defines unmarried couples as 
“common law partner[s]” after one year of living in “conjugal 
relationships”.72 Thus, some federal rights and obligations (tax, etc.) are 
ascriptive. They require partners to opt-in, such as by checking the “married” 
or “living common law” boxes on tax returns. Here, the filer does not 
choose; if their relationships fall under the definition of “common law,” they 
must indicate it. In this sense, the designation is ascriptive and not based on 
partners’ choice.73     
The shortcomings of an opt-in approach are well documented and I will 
not repeat them here in detail.74 One of the major weaknesses of such a 
system, as Albertina Antognini recently concluded in an analysis of U.S. 
cases, is that it favors partners who contribute financially to the purchase of 
property over “a relationship where the individuals follow a breadwinner-
 
68 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075–.076 (1980) (explaining that a cohabitation agreement is 
enforceable only if “the contract is written and signed by the parties”); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759, 
762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that cohabitation contracts in Florida must be in writing); Kohler 
v. Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (explaining that“[i]f live-in companions intend to share 
property, they should express that intention in writing.”). In 2015, New Jersey passed an amendment to 
its statute of frauds requiring that cohabitation contracts be in writing and that both parties have 
independent legal advice prior to execution. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West, Westlaw through L.2020, c. 60).  
69 See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (holding that cohabitation 
agreements are enforceable only with an “explicit and structured understanding of an express contract”).  
70 JULIEN D. PAYNE & MARILYN A. PAYNE, CANADIAN FAMILY LAW 50 (7th ed. 2017); Sanders, 
supra note 29, at 632. 
71 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation, and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 248–49 (2004) (“[E]x post determinations of the nature of the 
parties’ expectations about financial sharing and support are difficult.”).  
72 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227 (Can.); Income Tax Act, 
R.S.C. 1985, c 1 (Can.). 
73 Update your CRA Information: Change Your Marital Status, GOV’T OF CAN., 
https://www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/services/child-family-benefits/update-your-marital-status-
canada-revenue-agency.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2020) (“You must tell the Canada Revenue Agency 
(CRA) about your new marital status . . . .”).  
74 See, e.g., id. (discussing the difficulties in enforcing legal obligations in informal relationships).  
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homemaker model.”75 The opt-in approach also increases uncertainty 
because the law is so unsettled and, for that reason, is likely to result in the 
economically weaker partner’s not pursuing claims. For good reasons (not 
seeking legal recourse) because in most states, claims based on implied 
contacts in this arena are rarely successful. As Cynthia Bowman points out, 
it is probable that “cohabitants are only slightly more likely to obtain 
‘palimony’ in California than in New York if the claim rests upon an implied 
contract, and at least the courts in New York are more candid about 
disallowing such claims.”76 Describing the Canadian context in Ontario, one 
author notes that unjust enrichment claims are unpredictable and create a 
sense of uncertainty in the law.77 In such a legal regime, lawyers are likely 
to disfavor representation based on a contingency fee since chances of 
success are difficult to assess or are generally slim. Responding to the 
limitation of relying on couples to execute contracts, the Law Commission 
of Canada stated that a contract “is a tool beyond the reach of many people. 
Leaving the parties to design their own contractual or private law 
arrangements imposes too high a burden on people who do not have time, 
energy or the requisite knowledge to do so.”78 Finally, courts are notorious 
for their limited ability to discern partners’ intentions regarding property 
division—a process that involves invasion into partners’ intimate life and 
risks invoking the judge’s bias.79  
In opt-out regimes, the state applies the same financial obligations that 
married couples owe to unmarried couples, upon the request of at least one 
of the partners, if the nature of the couple’s relationship mimics, to some 
degree, that of married couples, regardless of the missing formalities. The 
system aims to increase certainty and predictability about unmarried 
couples’ legal situation while embracing a functional approach. Australia’s 
doctrine of “de facto relationship” and Israel’s doctrine of “reputed spouse” 
are examples of such an approach.80 Canadian provinces with this system 
are British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.81  
For instance, according to Section 3(1)(b) of BC’s FLA, a person is a 
“spouse”—for purposes of the division of property and spousal support—if 
they have “lived with another person in a marriage-like relationship” and 
“ha[ve] done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years” or “ha[ve] a child 
 
75Antognini, supra note 4, at 31.  
76 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 51.  
77 L. COMM’N OF CAN., supra note 39, at 115.  
78 Id.   
79 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 57; Scott, supra note 72, at 256–57.  
80 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 186–200 (discussing Canada and Australia); Talia Einhorn, Same-
Sex Family Unions in Israeli Law, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 222, 225 (2008).  
81 Robert Leckey, Cohabitation, Law Reform, and the Litigants, 31 INT’L J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 131, 
134 (2017) (discussing reforms in Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Manitoba); Alberta recently 
amended the Matrimonial Property Act, including adopting an opt-out mechanism effective Jan. 2020. 
Family Law Changes, ALBERTA.CA, https://www.alberta.ca/family-law-changes.aspx.  
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with the other person.”82 It is a mixed directive composed of a firm rule (“at 
least two years”) and a standard (“in a marriage-like relationship”). Couples 
can opt out of these obligations by executing a contract that deviates from 
these default rules, namely, the rules of division of family assets and order 
to pay spousal support.  
The assumed benefit of this opt-out method is that couples do not need, 
on a case-by-case basis, to prove the nature of their relationships to incur 
mutual obligations.83 Advocates contend that this approach promotes 
certainty about what the law is, thereby minimizing litigation.84 Supporters 
also depict opt-out systems as particularly supportive of women because 
they protect women’s contribution to the growth of marital assets. This is 
because in an opt-in system, caregivers would have no rights to an equitable 
distribution of property acquired during the relationship at the relationship’s 
end. In theory, the scheme protects the economically vulnerable party 
(disproportionately female) by operating as a penalty default: a default that 
shifts the burden to convey information about intentions on the party who 
does not want an equal division of the assets.85 By imposing automatic 
obligations on couples two years after they begin living together in a 
marriage-like relationships, as the BC law does, lawmakers placed the 
burden of revealing their true intention (vis-à-vis obligations) on the 
economically stronger party, who has the incentive to opt out.86  
The interest in an opt-out approach reaches beyond Canada and has been 
the subject of fierce debate for many years.87 For instance, in 2002, the 
American Law Institute’s recommendations for family-law reform included 
adopting an opt-out approach under which couples who cohabit for three 
years (fewer if they have a child) would be presumed “domestic partners,” 
thus ascribing the same obligations as married couples have.88 Similarly, in 
her influential book Unmarried Couples, Law, and Public Policy, Cynthia 
 
82 Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25, § 3(1)(b) (Can.). 
83 Andrew Morrison, Who is a Family: Cohabitation, Marriage, and the Redefinition of Family, 29 
CAN. J. FAM. L. 381, 402–04 (2015). 
84 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 230; John-Paul Boyd, Reconstructing Domestic Relations: Improvements 
and Innovations in British Columbia’s New Family Law Act, 33 CAN. FAM. L.Q. 353, 354 (2014).  
85 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (explaining the concept of penalty default in a commercial context). 
86 Cf., Natasha Bakht, A v B and Attorney General of Quebec (Eric v Lola)—The Implications for 
Cohabiting Couples Outside Quebec, 28 CAN. J. FAM. L. 261, 272 (2014) (stating that an opt-out system 
“is beneficial because it automatically protects those most vulnerable who would not have the resources 
or knowledge to opt out, while still permitting those who wish to be independent as to property to retain 
individual autonomy”). 
87 See Heather Conway & Philip Girard, “No Place like Home”: The Search for a Legal Framework 
for Cohabitants and the Family Home in Canada and Britain, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 715, 769–70 (2005) 
(discussing legal reform in dealing with cohabitation in Canada and Britain); Matsumura, supra note 6, 
at 2065–66 (discussing some of the debates in the United States about an opt-out approach); Scott & 
Scott, supra note 12, at 343 n.189, 359 (noting that the ALI Principles “have gained little traction” and 
that “American states have not adopted either the Principles or the domestic-partnership status”). 
88 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, at ch. 1.  
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Bowman proposed that couples who live together for three years or have a 
child should be considered spouses for all legal purposes.89 Both the 
Institute’s and Bowman’s proposals encountered significant opposition. The 
traditionalist response contends that such laws would lead to a decline in 
marriages and confusion as to what each institution entails.90 Critical 
scholars assert that ascribing obligations to couples against their will 
“extends the shadow of marriage,” resulting in fewer variations and diversity 
of relationship structures that differ from marriage.91 Janet Halley calls the 
opt-out system “passive Marvin,” warning “that passive Marvin virtually 
annexes the law of marriage.”92  
As the opt-out approach is new, there is relatively little knowledge of 
how it operates in practice. Robert Leckey’s caselaw analysis of post-reform 
cases in BC and Saskatchewan found courts “breathing life into … the 
‘marriage-like relationship’” standard while invoking their own biases and 
normative judgments about what counts as “marriage-like.”93 It seems the 
reform has not fully realized its goal of maximum predictability, with 
Leckey concluding that “[d]isputes over the ‘spousal’ nature of a 
cohabitation and that nature’s duration make it harder for cohabitants to 
claim a share of family property than for married spouses.”94 He further finds 
12% of pre-reform cases in BC and Saskatchewan included disputes about 
the nature of the parties’ relationship, a proportion that grew to 30% post-
reform.95 Overall, however, other than this shift, “there was no radical 
change in the population of litigants” pre- and post-reform, and “[t]here is 
little change regarding the sexes of the parties, their ages, their economic 
activities . . . the presence of children, and the average and median durations 
of their unions.”96 The comparison also suggests that post-reform courts 
awarded larger amounts, although post-reform data are derived from only 
 
89 BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 223–38.   
90 See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 
42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 325, 331 (2008) (arguing against the ALI proposal and other conscriptive schemes); 
Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s “Domestic 
Partners” Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1193, 1199–1200 (2001) (arguing that the ALI proposal 
“are stunningly excessive and inappropriate, simply imported wholesale from marriage law rather than 
tailored to the characteristics of domestic partnerships. . . . Many provisions are overbroad, loose, and 
ambiguous.”); Amy L. Wax, The Family Law Doctrine of Equivalence, 107 MICH. L. REV. 999, 1012 
(2009) (“The alternatives to marriage create a plethora of choices and uncertainties. The understandings, 
roles, and duties that attend the myriad liaisons short of marriage are murky, confused, conflicting, and 
poorly defined.”) 
91 Franke, supra note 49, at 2697 (“The intended effect of the ALI Principles is to enlarge marriage 
law’s shadow.”).  
92 Halley, supra note 37, at 20, 22.  
93 Leckey, supra note 55, at 34–35.  
94 Robert Leckey, Cohabitation, Female Sacrifice, and Judge-Made Law, 41 J. SOC. WELFARE & 
FAM. L. 72, 74 (2019).  
95 Leckey, supra note 81, at 139. 
96 Id. 
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nineteen cases, potentially reflecting an incomplete picture.97 Considering 
Leckey’s analysis, it is reasonable to conclude that the opt-out approach 
adopted in BC and Saskatchewan has failed to achieve its goal of increased 
certainty to the maximum extent (and thus did not minimize litigation) 
because parties, more aggressively than before the reform, dispute that they 
live in a “marriage-like” relationship.98  
In conclusion, as nonmarriage is on the rise in countries worldwide, it 
serves as a fertile ground for regulatory dilemmas and disagreements. The 
opt-in and opt-out systems each include some benefits and carry some 
significant drawbacks. In particular, they both try to balance the 
predictability and protection of economically vulnerable parties on the one 
hand and autonomy and diversity (of relationships) on the other. The opt-out 
approach is harder to evaluate given its newness and the relative lack of 
research. The next Part describes the methodology I used to test the effects 
of an opt-out regime.     
II.  METHODS 
Except for Leckey’s scholarship on the opt-out regimes in BC and 
Saskatchewan, there is no literature exploring the repercussions that such a 
scheme has on the legal system and the affected couples. Moreover, 
Leckey’s work, as valuable as it is, tells us only about the way couples in an 
opt-out system fared in court. We do not know how many couples did not 
reach court in the first place because they predicted that their relationships 
would or would not be considered “marriage-like,” or because they had other 
misconceptions about the law. Put simply, caselaw analysis provides only 
partial data about how the reform influenced the behaviors of couples before 
relationship breakdowns. It also does not account for whether couples’ 
behavior changed because of the law, in terms of choosing whether to move 
in together or whether to execute an agreement.  
This study seeks to learn about the effect an opt-out scheme has on 
couples outside the court. To use the words of Susan Silbey, “To know what 
law does and how it works, we needed to know how ‘we the people’ might 
be contributing to the law’s systemic effects, as well as to its 
ineffectiveness.”99 
 Accordingly, my goal is to learn how couples in informal relationships 
operate within an opt-out regime, particularly, how couples navigate the 
terrain of relationship recognition, even if they are unaware of the law or do 
not seek recourse from legal institutions. Fundamentally, the impact of a law 
concerning couples’ legal recognition begins long before parties plan to split 
 
97 Id. at 138. 
98 Id. at 139 (“[L]aw reform appears to have increased disputes about the duration of the union or 
the duration of cohabitation that could be qualified as ‘marriage-like’ or ‘as spouses.’”).   
99 Susan S. Silbey, After Legal Consciousness, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 323, 326 (2005).  
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up. Couples might decide one of the following: to postpone moving in 
together to avoid or delay the law’s application; to execute a contract that 
deviates from the default rules; to informally create obligations different 
from those reflected by the default rules; or not to use the legal apparatus at 
all upon separation. Couples might initially be ignorant of the law but later 
use it as a bargaining tool when contemplating separation. Conversely, they 
may assume that the law reflects the desirable or common norm, and they 
should comply. Again, borrowing Silbey’s words, my interest extends beyond 
an exploration of the law’s effectiveness, more broadly, to the “law’s effects.”100     
From the perspective of legal realism, law is more than what the 
lawmaker legislates and the judge adjudicates. Relying on the work of 
Karl Llewellyn, and applying it in the context of relationship recognition, 
Janet Halley maintains that legal realism views laws as operated and 
practiced by all those who use them.101 The group of users includes 
“everyone who alters his or her conduct or even his or her ideas to reflect 
predictions about how legally authorized agents will behave.”102 Under this 
understanding, the law is broader than the black-letter law: the law is its 
effects. And the effects of the law of adult relationships kick in long before 
a couple contemplates divorce or separation. Building on Lewis Kornhauser 
and Robert Mnookin’s ever-important work, Halley points out that intimate 
partners bargain “in the shadow of the law,” not only in divorce 
settlement.103 Rather, the shadow of the default rules “permeates marriage 
and may even be important in conditioning [couples’] interactions on their 
first date.”104 This assumption—that the law of adult relationships can 
metaphorically throw its shadow on relationships long before the breakup—
motivates this study and is also tested by this study.  
Using BC as a real-world laboratory, the study’s primary objective is to 
produce and report qualitative data about couples’ experiences of—and 
attitudes toward—the current opt-out system. Through semi-structured 
interviews with thirty couples who live in non-formalized relationships, I try 
to get a better sense of the drawbacks and advantages of such a system and 
how it has affected the couples’ behaviors (if at all).  
My research assistant and I have conducted interviews with twenty-
seven different-sex and three same-sex couples.105 The participants’ ages 
 
100 Id. at 328.  
101 Halley, supra note 37, at 47–48 (relying on Llewellyn’s work in K. N. Llewellyn, Behind the 
Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281 (1932)).  
102 Id. at 48 (emphasis omitted). 
103 Halley, supra note 37, at 48–49 (citing Lewis Kornhauser & Robert H. Mnookin, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979)).  
104 Id. at 49.  
105 For the purpose of this Article, I did not separate the same- and different-sex couples because I 
do not think that the experience of same-sex couples regarding knowing and understanding the law is 
markedly different. Although there is a possibility that same-sex couples would be more egalitarian in 
dividing property or would have greater familiarity with legal instruments like contracts, because of the 
years without the possibility of marriage, the interviews suggested that they were not different from the 
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ranged from twenty-one to forty-eight. Only four couples had a partner older 
than forty, and in only one relationship were both partners older than forty. 
Overall, most of the sample is composed of partners between the ages of 
twenty-seven and thirty-five. Appendix A provides information about each 
interviewee’s age, ethnicity (self-described), religion, and occupation.106 
Seven couples had children, four of them from previous relationships and 
three shared; some children lived in the household most of the time and some 
with their custodial parent.  
Criteria for inclusion in the study were couples who had lived two to 
five years together in unmarried relationships. This was an important factor: 
as these couples had moved in together when the FLA was already in force, 
I was able to examine whether that law had any effect on their cohabitation 
decisions. Interviews with couples residing in Vancouver were conducted 
face-to-face at a time and location suggested by participants. Most 
frequently, the interview was held at a coffee shop and occasionally in 
people’s homes. Twelve interviews were held on Skype—with couples 
living in other parts of BC (e.g., Whistler, Kamloops, Victoria).  
Recruitment efforts changed over time. Initially, I used my own social 
media accounts (I excluded first-circle relationships to interviewers) as well 
as UBC’s and Allard School of Law’s accounts. I also placed ads in cafés 
around Vancouver and in a community center. Later, I used Facebook ads 
to reach out to larger populations, including people unconnected with my 
circles. I compensated participants by giving each couple a $60 Amazon gift 
card—an amount approved by UBC’s Behavioural Research Ethics Board. 
Though the sample is diverse in several ways, most respondents were 
highly educated, middle-income young professionals between the ages of 
twenty-seven and thirty-five. All individuals except four have at least a 
bachelor’s degree or are in the process of obtaining one. Participants mostly 
fit into what are traditionally considered middle-class occupations, 
according to social-class classification schemes.107 Further, with one 
exception, all are nonreligious individuals. In sum, the sample is likely to 
reflect common experiences among young, middle-class, highly educated, 
and secular couples, a population that has, or is presumed to have, an interest 
in property division and other financial obligations between partners. Early 
adulthood is the ideal age for this study, as this population often represents 
individuals who are in the primary years of building a career, accumulating 
assets, and creating significant interdependency.108 This population, I assume, 
 
others. In any event, my results would have remained the same if the sample included only the twenty-
seven different-sex couples.   
106 See infra Appendix A for the sociodemographic of the interviewees.  
        107 See ROBERT ERIKSON & JOHN H. GOLDTHORPE, THE CONSTANT FLUX: A STUDY OF CLASS 
MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 38–46 (1992) (providing a class schema). 
108 See SHARON SASSLER & AMANDA JAYNE MILLER, COHABITATION NATION: GENDER, CLASS, 
AND THE REMAKING OF RELATIONSHIPS 14 (2017) (justifying their decision to interview couples between 
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will have relationship patterns of a joint venture, compared with older 
couples who might be living on their retirement savings and be in their 
second or third major relationship. Additionally, as I explain in Section 
III.A, this population—of all populations—has the strongest reason to know 
about the rules concerning obligations between partners.109       
By the same token, the sample has some limitations: it primarily 
contains well-educated individuals, in their midlife years, with a secular 
orientation. I did not interview any elderly couples, recent immigrants from 
Asia, or other racialized individuals, to name just a few of the relevant 
groups left out. I fully acknowledge that these groups might (or even likely) 
have different narratives and legal needs.110 In a future project, I aim to focus 
on these populations. As well, the sampling of same-sex couples is too small 
to draw any conclusions about differences between those couples and their 
different-sex counterparts.111 Finally, I have only a small sample of couples 
who raise children together. I believe that this is a strength of this research. 
For one, the presumption of equal sharing and requirement of support is 
more justifiable when one of the partners has made career sacrifices to raise 
children. In other words, such a situation presents the least controversial 
argument in favor of an opt-out regime.112 Indeed, most opt-out regimes 
 
eighteen and thirty-six because they are at “the prime family formation years when young adults make 
key decisions about work, marriage, and children”). See generally, Harry T. Reis, Yi-Cheng Lin, M. 
Elizabeth Bennett, & John B. Nezlek, Change and Consistency in Social Participation During Early 
Adulthood, 29 DEV. PSYCH. 633 (1993) (discussing the centrality of relationships to the lives of early adults).  
109 See infra Section III.A (discussing the particular reasons the interviewees had an incentive to 
know the default rules).  
110 The mentioned groups have or might have a particular interest in regulating adult relationships. 
Elderly couples constitute one of the largest groups of cohabitants in the United States. BOWMAN, supra 
note 28, at 118–20. They have a lot to lose from an automatic presumption of marriage; for example, loss 
of social benefits or alimony or disputes with children (their own or their partner’s) about inheritance. 
Aloni, supra note 43, at 582–83. Recent immigrants from Asia comprise a big group of Canadian 
residents that warrant scholarly attention. According to the 2016 census, over one-fifth of Canada’s 
population is foreign-born: the majority (61.8%) of newcomers to Canada from 2011 to 2016 were born 
in Asia. STAT. CAN., IMMIGRATION AND ETHNOCULTURAL DIVERSITY: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2016 
CENSUS (Oct. 25, 2017), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/171025/dq171025b-eng.htm 
[hereinafter STATISTICS CANADA: IMMIGRATION]. The 2006 Canadian census found that 
living arrangements vary by ethnocultural group. Anne Milan, Leslie-Anne Keown & Covadonga Robles 
Urquijo, Families, Living Arrangements, and Unpaid Work, in WOMEN IN CANADA: A GENDER-BASED 
STATISTICAL REPORT 18 (2011), https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/89-503-x/2010001/article/11546-
eng.htm. In the United States, immigrant groups have also struggled to cope with the law of unmarried 
couples; they came with their own understandings of what constitutes a marriage or a union—a situation 
leading to confusion and injustice. BOWMAN, supra note 28, at 114–16. 
111 For recent studies of the different ways same-sex married couples divide housework and 
conceive of their obligations, see, for example, Suzanne A. Kim & Edward Stein, Gender in the Context 
of Same-Sex Divorce and Relationship Dissolution, 56 FAM. CT. REV. 384, 388–89 (2018); KENNETH 
MATOS, FAMS. & WORK INST., MODERN FAMILIES: SAME- AND DIFFERENT-SEX COUPLES NEGOTIATING 
AT HOME 7–10 (2015), http://www.familiesandwork.org/downloads/modern-families.pdf; Melanie E. 
Brewster, Lesbian Women and Household Labor Division: A Systematic Review of Scholarly Research 
from 2000 to 2015, 21 J. LESBIAN STUD. 47, 63–65 (2017). 
112 See, e.g., Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, The Costs of Raising Children: Toward a Theory of Financial 
Obligations Between Co-Parents, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 179, 190 (2012) (arguing that “the 
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create a special rule for people who raise children together (i.e., waive the 
requirement of living together two years before the presumption arises). 
Second, the number of adults who live without children in the United States 
and Canada is growing exponentially, and it is interesting to learn how 
norms of sharing operate in such a situation.113 Nevertheless, the opt-out 
regimes are not limited to couples who have children, but they apply to 
childless couples regardless.  
Vancouver—along with the other locations—is ideal for such a study 
because it is one of the most expensive real-property markets in North 
America.114 It is reasonable to assume that couples with even a small interest 
in real property will be motivated to respond to laws concerning division of 
properties. Vancouver is also an immigrant city, with a little over 40% of its 
population composed of newcomers.115 As the interviews confirm, coupleship 
recognition is linked to immigration processes. 
The BC experience can provide a valuable lesson to the United States. 
In terms of recognizing spouses and unmarried couples, Canadian and 
American family law systems share similar principles.116 Scholarly and 
public debates about the recognition of informal relationships raise the same 
concerns and assumptions.117 They both have a mix of federal and provincial 
or state law. Further, there is no reason to believe couples’ experiences in 
BC would differ from those in the United States.118 While there are pertinent 
 
obligations created between adults by virtue of their joint parenthood should not be limited to the activity 
of parenting, but rather extend to financial obligations that they owe one another.”).  
113 See, e.g., Emily Schondelmyer, Fewer Married Households and More Living Alone, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (Aug. 9, 2017), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2017/08/more-adults-living-without-
children.html.  
114 Jessica Dorfmann, New Wealth Seeks a “Home”: The Global Rise of the Hedge City, 36 HARV. 
INT’L REV. 4, 4 (2015). 
115 STATISTICS CANADA: IMMIGRATION, supra note 110. 
116 Much of the law concerning informal relationships relies on contractual principles, such as 
requirements of formalities, implied contracts, and principles of unjust enrichment. The United States 
and Canadian systems, with the exceptions of Louisiana and Quebec, share the common-law principles 
pertaining to contracts between intimate partners. 
117 The societal and legal issues concerning increased cohabitation in the United States and Canada 
have long been compared. See, e.g., Pamela J. Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary 
North America, in JUST LIVING TOGETHER: IMPLICATIONS OF COHABITATION ON FAMILIES, CHILDREN, 
AND SOCIAL POLICY 48, 48 (Alan Booth & Ann C. Crouter eds., 2002) (analyzing the role of unmarried 
cohabitation in Canada and the United States side-by-side).  
118 There are significant differences in Canada and the United States about the types of benefits 
attached to marriage, such as health insurance and taxation. In Canada, fewer attributes are connected to 
marriage. There are also differences when it comes to the level of religiosity of the populations. However, 
regarding legal obligations between the partners upon breakup, the differences are minor. It is still the 
case, as I detailed before, that in Canada (like in the United States), the creation of obligations between 
partners depends on the recognition of their relationships as marital or marital-like.  
Most importantly, the reality is that in the United States, as in Canada, there is a growing societal 
need to craft family law that responds to the situation at hand. The number of divorces, nonmarital unions, 
and children born to unmarried parents necessitates a response from the courts and, eventually, the 
political system. While some in the United States attach greater importance to marriage than Canadians 
do, the values and attitudes in the United States concerning family life are changing rapidly, making the 
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differences concerning the importance of marriage between populations in 
both countries, there are no germane differences in the way that couples 
discuss (or do not discuss) obligations, the problems with entering into 
contracts among intimate couples, the rationales in protecting the investment 
of the primary care provider in the relationships, the societal expectations 
about norms of sharing the assets of the relationships, and the 
misconceptions that couples have about the law.119 There are also no 
applicable differences in the values and considerations that underpin the law 
in this area.120  
I and my research assistant, Adam Yang Vanzala, a sociology PhD 
candidate, conducted the interviews. I contemplated whether to interview 
the partners in each couple together or separately (but simultaneously), 
noting that Sharon Sassler and Amanda Miller recently chose to interview 
partners separately to “assess partner similarities and differences in 
responses.”121 While separately interviewing partners provides more candid 
answers and exposes conflicting narratives, I nevertheless chose to interview 
partners together, as I was particularly interested in identifying points of 
agreement and contention between them. Observing the partners’ reactions 
to each other’s statements on recognition added a clarifying dimension to 
the interviews. Though each individual may have tailored their responses to 
please their partner or to mitigate any potentially uncomfortable moments, 
some topics evoked a considerable amount of disagreement as well as 
resonance. Therefore, interviewing partners together allowed us to identify 
clear points of agreement and even contention between them. When 
answering the questions, I noticed individuals relied on their partner for 
recall and frequently corrected each other when something one partner 
mentioned did not correspond to the other’s account. Separate interviews 
might not reflect how things happen in their everyday lives, something only 
naturalistic observation could answer, but it provides a better snapshot of 
people’s relationship dynamics. Using this methodology also allowed us to 
combine the interdisciplinary skills of legal and sociological training. 
The interview consisted of a semi-structured, open-ended format. 
Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and initially analyzed using an open-
coding strategy to identify emerging themes. I started the interview with 
 
experience in Canada highly relevant.  
119 For discussion on U.S. couples’ knowledge about their legal obligations, see Ira Mark Ellman & 
Sanford L. Braver, Should Marriage Matter?, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 170, 171–72 (Marsha 
Garrison & Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) (describing U.K. and U.S. studies about couples’ understanding 
of the law and concluding that legal misconceptions are prevalent and that couples do not focus on legal 
aspects of their relationships).  
120 Indeed, as the ALI Principles state, some U.S. jurisdictions already follow the BC model: 
“Although not always articulated in this way, several American jurisdictions follow a status approach 
similar to that adopted in this section, as do several Canadian provinces . . . .” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra 
note 4, at § 6.03.  
121 SASSLER & MILLER, supra note 108, at 199.  
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questions concerning the pre-cohabitation period, the reasons the couple 
moved in together, the timing of moving in together, and the transition 
period from dating to cohabiting. Without asking directly at this point, I used 
this early questioning to gauge whether the law played any role in their 
decision to move in together or not to do so. I then asked a set of questions 
regarding the division of housework labor, followed by queries about 
sharing financial expenses and about other economic aspects of their 
relationships (e.g., “How are housing costs divided between the two of you? 
How much has living together improved the economic well-being of each 
one of you?”).  
Next, I asked couples about their plans for the future: what are their 
long-term plans; whether they want to have children; and whether they 
intend to stay in the same place in the near future. I did this to learn a bit 
more about the level of commitment the couple has. I then asked about the 
legal obligations between the partners: whether they have made any formal 
or informal agreement about the division of property or support; whether 
they know the law; what they think the law says; and whether the law reflects 
their understanding of their relationships. I further asked whether they knew 
about the law when they moved in together and if they think their 
relationship meets the definition of “marriage-like.” In the final stage, before 
collecting demographic data, I tried to get further information about the 
relationship’s nature and particularly about each couple’s decision not to get 
married. Overall, I gathered a considerable data pool that increases 
knowledge about many aspects of cohabiting couples. Some of the results—
those about unmarried couples in an opt-out regime—are discussed in the 
following Part.    
III. ASCRIPTION TROUBLE 
This Part discusses the major findings of the qualitative study and draws 
on them to analyze the effects of the opt-out model. Section A describes the 
engagement of the couples with the law. Section B uses the interviewees’ 
experiences to assess the level of ascription. Section C examines the degree 
to which couples’ behaviors and expectations conform with the equal-
sharing presumption that defaults supply. Section D enquires into the 
constitutive impact that the law has on couples who live under this regime.  
A. The Choice of Defaults 
Couples in my sample had an abysmal understanding of the law, a hard 
time comprehending the law if they tried, difficulties discussing their 
obligations with one another, and challenges in executing contracts. This 
Section reports what I learned from the interviews regarding these aspects.  
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1. Knowing and Understanding the Law 
To better understand whether couples can opt out from default regimes, 
we need to know whether they are aware of the automatic obligations that 
their relationships raise.  
The study finds that couples’ degree of familiarity with and 
understanding of the law is tenuous. A third of the couples (ten out of thirty) 
were completely ignorant about the law’s existence or knew so little as can 
be characterized as nonexistent. When asked if they knew anything about 
the law concerning their obligations, they responded that they knew nothing. 
Over time, I found out that many couples who initially said that they knew 
nothing actually knew more than they realized, so I always followed up with 
probing questions (such as, “Do you know whether you have any financial 
obligations vis-à-vis one another upon breakup?”) to examine real levels of 
knowledge. This third expressed ignorance about the laws governing their 
mutual obligations even after I probed.  
In only seven out of the thirty couples, both partners had a good 
understanding of the law; in two other couples, only one partner had a good 
understanding. By “good understanding,” I mean an awareness that the 
couple was recognized as spouses automatically, without taking any 
affirmative steps. The rest of the couples—thirteen out of thirty—had 
different degrees of understanding of the law but fell into one or more 
common mistakes, which I discuss below.  
One such mistake was not realizing they could opt out of the law’s 
application regarding their mutual financial obligations. Namely, in five 
couples, at least one partner (and typically both) thought that the two years 
was a mandatory regime, without a way out. Eve122 (twenty-nine), who knew 
the law rather well, answered, “I did not know you could opt out of it, I kind 
of thought it was a—it automatically happened, regardless.” Jessica (thirty-
three) mentioned that she “wasn’t aware you could opt out or go to a notary 
or whatever and have something formalized there, so effectively a prenup.” 
The opposite misunderstanding, however, was much more common: 
approximately a quarter of the interviewees mistakenly expressed the idea 
that they needed to “apply” in order to be considered “spouses” or “common 
law” partners (in other words, they believed they were living under an opt-
in regime).123 Danny (twenty-five), an urban-gardener with a master’s 
degree in public policy, had a typical response: “I have a vague 
 
122 Eve is not her real name; all interviewees’ names used herein are aliases. 
123 Couples are right that triggering the law’s application requires one of the partners to claim 
property rights or support from the other partner or to apply to court. Yet, at least for some federal 
purposes, these couples ought to choose the designation of “living common law” if they live in conjugal 
relationships. See, e.g., Old Age Security Act, RSC 1985, c-9, S 2 (Can.) (“common-law partner, in 
relation to an individual, means a person who is cohabiting with the individual in a conjugal relationship 
. . . .”). Further, theoretically, the entitlement to an equal share in a partner’s property is created without 
any affirmative step, even if the partners do not seek to exercise their right.     
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understanding of common law [relationships] in general and applying for 
that, which we haven’t done.”  
Couples with some understanding of the law, or knowledge about its 
existence, typically heard about it from friends and sometimes from family 
or just had a general idea about it. Jenny’s response is typical: “I have a 
general idea, I don’t know where I learned this, but like I have a general 
sense that unmarried couples have virtually the same rights as married 
couples. That’s just what I’ve been told or what I’ve heard on the street . . . .”  
Even couples with a solid legal understanding fell into the other 
common mistake I observed: they confused how long it takes to be 
considered “common-law partners” for federal purposes (after living in a 
“conjugal relationship” for one year) with how long it takes to be considered 
“spouses” for provincial purposes (after two years, in BC).124 Eight couples 
in the interviews mixed up the federal and the provincial time requirements. 
As one partner with a basic understanding of the law stated, “It’s kind of 
confusing, too, because there are some things that say you’re common law 
after one year and then there’s some things that say you’re common law after 
two years, so I’m not really sure how that’s decided.” While the problem of 
different timelines at the federal and provincial levels is unique to Canada, 
there is a good chance that similar confusions will occur in the United States.125  
If you think that being confused about the timing is not a big deal, 
consider the following story. Tim and Tommy, a same-sex couple, moved 
from Scotland to BC in 2017. Tim, a native English speaker with a PhD in 
chemistry, was a permanent resident of Canada and, on that basis, aimed to 
sponsor Tommy. The problem was that when Tim first entered Canada, he 
checked the box for “single,” despite having lived together with Tommy for 
thirteen months (and hence already considered in a conjugal relationship for 
one year). He did this because they thought their relationship was only 
federally recognized after two years. “We thought it took two years cause 
when you Google it, it says British Columbia common law, two years, so we 
thought there was a special situation for this province only—that overruled 
the federal one which said one year only.” The situation was, then, that Tim 
was “accidentally lying” (his words), because he was confused between the 
two different time-dependent definitions. After consulting a lawyer, and 
paying much for such guidance, Tommy had to apply for permanent 
residency on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, only because of, as 
Tim says, “an honest mistake cause, basically, you ticked the wrong box”—
 
124 Margrit Eichler, Common-Law Unions in Canada, CAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Sept. 21, 2016), 
https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/common-law-unions-in-canada#. See also Family 
Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c 25 § 3(1)(b)(i) (Can.) (defining a “spouse” as a person who “has lived with 
another person in a marriage-like relationship, and has done so for a continuous period of at least 2 years”).  
125 In the United States, marital status matters at the federal and state level and each can define 
eligible marriages differently. For why and how the federal government shapes family law, see Courtney 
G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787, 788 (2015).  
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even though, when one looks up the definition online, “it literally says two 
years.” The consequences of this mistake are devastating: processing such 
an application can take up to twenty-nine months. Tim and Tommy applied 
a year ago; during this time, Tommy has not been allowed to work or leave 
the country, so Tim serves as the sole provider.  
When BC promulgated the reform, legislators noted, “During the 
consultation period, feedback indicated that many unmarried couples now 
are under the mistaken belief that, after two years, they are treated the same 
as married couples and are entitled to division of property if they separate. 
This misunderstanding causes significant disadvantage.”126 The findings call 
into question the data that the BC lawmakers relied on when deliberating 
about adopting an opt-out approach. It is hard to believe that before the BC 
law was passed couples thought they were deemed married after two years 
of cohabitation—given that, even now, when it is the law, they have little 
idea that they are considered spouses. Another rationale for the reform was 
harmonization: making the law simpler by using the same period as various 
other acts.127 As this study evidenced, this objective has not been achieved, 
as the most important distinction—the one between the federal and the 
provincial laws—is often confused.   
Understanding the law is difficult even for those who try hard to do so. 
Two partners, Romeo (twenty-one) and Juliet (twenty-one), are students at 
UBC in highly competitive programs; they are native English speakers who 
come across as highly articulate. When they were close to reaching their 
two-year threshold, they tried to comprehend the law by researching both 
BC and federal websites. Despite being sophisticated readers and 
researchers, they were unable to grasp the relevant laws fully. As Romeo 
described, “I remember that I had a bit of trouble figuring out whether 
common law was federal or provincial law.” Further, he “also had trouble 
figuring out whether it was something that you could decide or declare or 
apply for versus whether it was forced upon you.” Both of them reported 
frustration at being unable to decipher these legal regimes, despite the 
noteworthy effort.    
Similarly, Ryan (thirty-five), whose job as a union negotiator often 
includes engaging with legal materials, and Jessica (thirty-three), an 
occupational therapist, described their frustration and confusion in trying to 
understand the law:  
Jessica: I remember doing some research about when, what is 
the timeline for when you’re considered common law because 
I have heard different things from different friends where [ ] 
 
126 Family Law Act Questions and Answers, GOV’T OF B.C. 7 (Apr. 11, 2013), 
https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/about-bc-justice-system/legislation-
policy/fla/faq.pdf.  
127 Id.  
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some people said six months . . . and then other stuff was two 
years, and it was just really unclear if there was a time limit 
kind of thing. . . . And I wanted to get an idea of what sort of 
rights and obligations that did provide. [I] work in healthcare, 
I’m quite concerned with healthcare matters, and I wanted to 
know . . . if I’m someone’s common-law partner am I their 
next of kin as a spouse would be, can I make healthcare 
decisions for them . . . ? And I did a lot of Googling at the time 
and I never really felt confident in the information that I was 
able to get; it was just very unclear at that time . . . . 
Ryan: And I would say something very similar, which is that 
I had trouble figuring out what was sort of covered by 
provincial law and what might be federal. 
Many couples had good reasons to know the law (regarding their mutual 
obligations), discuss the law, and reach some shared understanding of their 
mutual obligations. The couples’ responses often revealed that they had 
intended to keep some properties out of their partner’s reach. One-third of 
the couples had what I characterize as a “strong interest” in clarifying their 
legal position (since they own realty together) or in excluding property from 
the shared pool. Further, a few couples had title to the property under only 
one of the partners’ names (e.g., one partner did not have a permanent 
residency when they purchased or was not qualified to take a mortgage). In 
addition to co-owning property, one couple had a business for which one 
serves as the de facto CEO and the other as the service provider. Further, a 
few interviewees had a strong interest and stated intention not to share the 
liability of their partner’s debt.   
Another third of the couples I interviewed had what I characterize as a 
“moderate interest” in clarifying their legal obligations, as they owned 
significant assets from before the relationships. While property bought 
before a relationship is separate under BC law (i.e., is excluded from family 
property and is not part of the distribution pool),128 transmutations of 
property occurred in many of these couples’ dealings—and tracing the 
origins of contributions is complex.129 For instance, one partner moved into 
the apartment that her partner owned; recently, they sold it and purchased a 
new property together. Another partner sold shares she owned and bought 
property while together with a partner (appreciation on such property is 
considered marital property130). Additionally, while the assets purchased 
before the relationships are excluded, their appreciation is part of the 
divisible family property, and some partners might want to avoid this. Many 
interviewees were ignorant about this point. Others contributed to their 
 
128 Family Law Act § 85(1)(a).  
129 Id. at § 85(1)(g) (tracing of excluded property). 
130 Id. at § 84(1)(a), 84(2)(g). 
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retirement savings while together (which makes such savings part of the 
family property131), co-owned a car, or both. All these people had good 
reasons to sort out their obligations in advance. In any event, due to the 
vagueness, ambiguities, and uncertainties of the law of property division and 
of spousal support, it is wise for those with property to formalize their legal 
obligations.132 
2. Cognitive Bias and Overoptimism 
Notwithstanding these incentives to put their legal rights and 
responsibilities in order, couples have given this little thought or have had 
very unclear understandings about how or why it is relevant to them. 
Daniella (thirty-six), a sophisticated, business-oriented person, 
acknowledged that she and her partner’s properties are “a giant mess. If we 
ever get separated it will be a big battle.” Yet, Yossi, her forty-year-old 
partner, stated that he “didn’t really think about [their obligations].”  
Most couples did not discuss obligations directly, due to a combination 
of trust, naïveté, and dislike of what they felt was mixing the personal with 
business. Despite having a business together and being experienced with 
buying and selling properties, Daniella and Yossi felt mingling love with 
domestic agreements does not make sense. Yossi explained that signing a 
contract is “like business, bring[ing] a business into a relationship.” Danielle 
mentioned that her mother asked her whether she would sign a contract, as 
she “was coming into the relationship with a lot more assets than [Yossi].” 
Yet, she “figured, even though [Yossi] had a lot more debt and was not 
making money yet, [he] had potential, so [it’s] not [like he was] going to try 
to steal money from me.” Another female interviewee stated: “I guess we 
just haven’t really thought a lot about, you know, something as trivial as 
breaking up or like one of us dying, for example.” 
Erin (twenty-eight) is a lawyer who owns the apartment she lives in with 
her partner, Williams (twenty-eight), an elementary school teacher. Their 
informal agreement is that Williams is not entitled to any share of the 
property, including its appreciation. When they moved in together, Erin 
drafted a contract but eventually put it aside. When I asked her why she did 
this, she replied:  
Erin: I don’t know, I just figured that he’s a really reasonable 
person, and you know. 
Williams: I believe in good karma. 
Erin: I mean, I just don’t think that he’d go after me. 
 
131 Id. at § 84(2)(e). 
132 See JEFFREY BEHRENDT, THE ONLY COHABITATION AGREEMENT GUIDE YOU’LL EVER NEED: 
A CANADIAN LAWYER EXPLAINS ALL (2016) (noting that there are several good reasons to enter into a 
cohabitation agreement, among them, “the rules for property division for unmarried couples are very 
vague . . . .”).  
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Williams: If things went, went bad, that would just be a 
terrible thing to do.   
Earlier studies have found that married couples are too optimistic or too 
trusting to discuss financial topics that touch on possible breakup and to 
negotiate them effectively or are embarrassed to raise such issues with their 
partners.133 The interviews track similar patterns within cohabiting couples. 
Tim, for example, expressed, “We don’t foresee ourselves having any issues 
about breaking up or anything like that cause we’re too strong 
communication-wise, and we anticipate arguments before we even have 
them, we’re really academic in that, so . . . .” Yet, Tim, like other 
interviewees, is at greater risk of separation than married couples, as evident 
by the high separation rates among unmarried couples versus married.134 
Indeed, one study found that even in Quebec, the province with the highest 
cohabitation rate and the strongest acceptance of cohabitation as a marriage 
alternative, informal cohabitations remain more unstable than marriages.135 
In addition, married partners can afford some degree of optimism because 
they assume that the law duly protects them in case of divorce. But it is 
evident that at least half of the couples I interviewed did not assume the 
protection of the law in case of a breakup—so they do not have similar 
grounds to feel that the law adequately protects them.  
Couples not only underestimated their likelihood of breakup, but they 
were also highly optimistic about having an easy, clean separation. Despite 
experiencing complex divorces for both partners’ parents, Antonio (thirty) 
thought it would be different for them: “Now for me, it’s just easy, you know 
50/50, boom, if that had to happen.” Another couple, both engineers in their 
early thirties, shared a similar belief, as the male partner articulated: “We 
both have some respect, and trust each other, and . . . if we separated, it 
would be on . . . good terms, and we wouldn’t fight each other over things 
like a vehicle.” Likewise, Molly (thirty-three) expressed a similar sentiment 
when stating, “I have a very hard time picturing a situation that would get, 
like, super acrimonious . . . obviously that happens all the time, but I think 
 
133 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions 
and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 444 (1993) (discussing 
surveyed couples’ unrealistically positive projections for their own marital futures); Heather Mahar, Why 
Are There So Few Prenuptial Agreements? 2 (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. For L., Econ., and Bus., 
Discussion Paper No. 436, 2003), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/436.pdf 
(concluding that the death of premarital agreements can be explained by undue optimism regarding the 
unlikelihood of divorce and concerns that discussions around a prenuptial agreement suggest uncertainty 
about the success of one’s marriage). 
134 According to the 2011 General Social Survey on Families, out of five million individuals who 
ended relationships between 1990 and 2010, 49% dissolved a common-law relationship, and 44% 
dissolved a marriage. Maire Sinha, Parenting and Child Support After Separation or Divorce, 
in SPOTLIGHT ON CANADIANS: RESULTS FROM THE GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY 1, 5 (2014). 
135 France-Pascale Ménard, What Makes It Fall Apart? The Determinants of the Dissolution of 
Marriages and Common-Law Unions in Canada, 2 MCGILL SOC. REV. 59, 59–60 (2011).  
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we’re different.” Couples who reflect on their trust and naiveté often 
manifested some kind of ambivalence; after sharing a sentiment of trust, they 
proceeded with a statement of justification or self-doubt. “I don’t care what 
the law says. And maybe that’s ignorant and naïve,” stated Kelley. Then she 
acknowledged, “But again, we’re in a good place, right, so that is why the 
law is here.”136  
Only a small fraction of the couples had discussed the division of 
property in case of a breakup. One partner, twenty-nine years old from 
Victoria, described the motivation to discuss things as follows: “We’ve had 
conversations before because we’re not married, so it’s not like we have a 
formal arrangement of our finances. If something were to happen and we 
separated, it’s, well, what are we going to do? So ‘C’ and I have talked about it.”  
Ryan and Jessica (the union negotiator and occupational therapist) were 
engaged in a long process of clarifying their mutual obligations. One main 
motivation for this is that Jessica is divorced and wanted to ensure her 
independence. They have exchanged emails about the possible legal 
arrangement they would like to see, taking a very realistic approach. And 
although Jessica recounted the process as involving a “somewhat strange 
conversation about hypothetical reasons [to break up],” both partners 
eventually described the results as satisfying. Ryan explained the rationale 
for the agreement as follows:  
I felt good about it for the idea that we, presumably if we broke 
up, we might not like each other in that moment, we like each 
other now, we could have sort of respectful conversation now 
about what we wanted, and that might be easier to do now than 
it would be later. 
Jessica shared a similar sentiment:  
I felt really good, . . . I remember joking about this afterwards 
that even though we spent like half that day talking about what 
if we broke up, the idea that we could have that conversation 
just made me feel like more secure and, and confident in the 
relationship . . . .  
Although their experience was the exception, a few other couples had 
frank discussions about the legal arrangement. The next Section describes 
their attitudes toward a formal contract.  
3. The Problems with Executing a Contract 
Overall, only seven couples contemplated a contract. Merely two 
 
136 Separation from cohabiting relationships is likely to be at least as acrimonious as separation 
from divorce. One Australian study found that separated cohabiting parents reported more conflict than 
divorced parents and that ending cohabiting relationships “clearly does not prevent severe separation 
adjustment problems.” W. Kim Halford & Susie Sweeper, Trajectories of Adjustment to Couple 
Relationship Separation, 52 FAM. PROCESS 228, 240 (2013). 
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executed a formal one, and two others wrote an informal one. The couples’ 
diverse experiences exemplify the barriers that couples who overcome the 
cognitive bias face when wishing to opt out.  
When I asked Ryan and Jessica why they did not consult a lawyer and 
formalize their contract, they answered that “cost was a big part of it.” Kelley 
(forty-three) and Megan (forty-eight) are another couple that took steps 
toward writing a contract but did not formalize it. The problem is that a court 
might not enforce the contract because it did not comply with the formalities 
that guarantee the strongest protection from court intervention in setting 
aside the contract. The couple worked on a draft contract that arranged their 
relative ownership in their shared home (the title is only in Megan’s name). 
At the time of the interview, this draft remained on their computer, unsigned. 
BC law requires a cohabitation agreement regarding the division of property 
and debt be signed by both partners and witnessed by another person.137 
Because their agreement does not follow the required formalities, a court 
might or might not adhere to it—the law gives courts maximum discretion 
in such cases.138 When asked why they did not sign the agreement, they 
responded that they “were out of money for legal advice.” This is a telling 
response, as the law in BC does not require independent legal advice as a 
condition for enforceability. The response sheds light on the difficulty in 
entering into a contract without guidance.  
Other couples did not even consider writing an informal document 
because one of the partners resisted. Bertha (thirty) reported that they had 
“not sat down and talked to anyone or written anything out or signed any 
documents” and that she “wish[ed] we did, personally.” According to 
Bertha, her partner Wakeford (forty-two) had “pushed back” against her idea 
to hire a lawyer because he thought “they’re overpriced and that we are smart 
people.” On his side, Wakeford explained that he is the economically 
vulnerable party, and an agreement would be on his behalf. Thus, he 
claimed: 
When it’s my assets on the line, then I’m less inclined to say 
we need a formal contract. For instance, like buying a vehicle 
together—it’s registered and titled to her, so I’m the only one 
vulnerable, but I feel like if that was reversed, I definitely 
would not begrudge a more formal contract because she 
requires it. I would be completely open to that.  
Two couples shared a mutual intention to enter into a contract and did 
not execute one, at least not a binding one. One of those couples—the 
engineers—had attorney friends who advised them to enter into a contract 
and instructed them how. And while both partners “understood that it would 
 
137 Family Law Act, S.B.C. (2011), c 25 § 93(1) (Can.). 
138 Id. at § 93(6). 
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be good to have something on paper . . . we just didn’t have time for it.” 
Kemala (thirty) and Ethan (thirty-one) also wanted to enter into an 
agreement, but a few things stood in their way. Most importantly, they 
realized that there is not much to contract around because they do not own 
any property. Thus, Ethan explained, it became “low priority, we haven’t 
really put anything into place, we haven’t contacted a lawyer. I don’t even 
know what we would put in it.” Ethan then clarified that the reason he did 
not push to execute an agreement is that, because his main asset is under sole 
proprietorship, Kemala “can’t really claim half of that, it’s just me, or maybe 
I don’t know.” His last assertion is correct: he does not know—there is no 
reason to treat sole proprietorship as an excluded property.  
Surprisingly or not (because it goes against the stereotype), the two 
couples who executed a contract did it to protect the female partner’s 
property. Nivaan (twenty-six), a commercial banker, and her partner, Diter 
(twenty-nine), working for a software company, executed a contract that 
guarantees that Nivaan is the sole owner of the property they live in. Nivaan 
is an only child, and her parents paid for the down-payment on the 
apartment. Diter is not entitled to share from the appreciation of the property. 
Their contract, then, deviates from the default rules of property division. 
They have both had independent legal advice. Olivia (twenty-eight) and 
Logan (twenty-five) are another couple who entered into a formalized 
agreement. Olivia inherited a sum of money, which she used to buy the 
apartment they live in. Their contract replicates the default rules. The 
purpose of the contract was to clarify her ownership—including her sole 
ownership in a trust account—and to guarantee, in the words of Logan, “a 
fair and clean split.”   
Most couples who contemplated an agreement, then, did not form a 
binding agreement. The two who executed a contract did this to secure the 
property owner’s rights in the living space they were sharing. Both couples 
relied on legal advice.  
In conclusion, we have so far observed, on one end of the spectrum, 
couples who know a nominal amount about the law and hold inaccurate 
perceptions about their legal position; most commonly, they think they need 
to apply for recognition as spouses, or they are confused about the time at 
which obligations automatically attach to their relationships. On the other 
end of the spectrum, we find couples who believe that they cannot opt out 
or who find the process of contracting too onerous. In addition, we witnessed 
cognitive biases that inhere in such relationships: partners’ overestimation 
of their chances of staying together, expectations of a clean breakup, 
combined with couples’ limited ability to engage with each other on these topics.    
B. The Defaults of Choice 
Based on the findings so far, I suggest that BC’s opt-out regime, as it 
currently operates, is highly ascriptive in its nature. For those who are 
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unaware of the law altogether, or who think they must take active steps to 
enjoy its protection, the law imposes obligations “by surprise.” As one 
interviewee observed, some people “kind of get trapped into that law without 
really knowing the details.” Danny articulated a similar attitude: “I don’t 
have an issue with this law as I understand it now, but I have an issue with 
not knowing about it, having lived in BC for years.”  
I do not claim that the law imposes obligations that all couples would 
find unreasonable or that are different from what they would have expected 
anyway. Rather, scholars who support an opt-out approach often respond to 
critiques about the harm to the autonomy of unmarried couples by stating, 
“[a]s with marriages, if the parties do not like the norm, they may contract 
around it.”139 But the assertion that couples can easily exercise choice by 
opting out, that this law minimally affects them, is mistaken. Further, the 
assumption that not contracting out indicates implicit agreement to a sharing 
regime is just as wrong as the argument that couples indicate their consent 
to the default rules by not opting in.   
In cases where residents do not know the law, BC’s degree of ascription 
serves as an offense to autonomy and to the law’s legitimacy. Some scholars 
react to this appraisal of autonomy violation by arguing that “[t]he flaw is 
the premise that those who marry or do not marry accurately understand the 
legally enforceable economic obligations that each will have towards the 
other. In [the United States] federal system, it is not possible for this 
proposition to be true.”140 Married couples, as well, the argument goes, have 
not consented to the default rules of financial obligations upon divorce 
because they cannot possibly know them. Accordingly, inscription (on 
unmarried couples) is based on a notion of consent similar to that which the 
law assumes regarding support obligations for married couples.  
What such a critique misses are the functions that formalities (such as 
marriage) serve. While it is true that married couples often also do not know 
the nitpicky rules of division of property and spousal support, the process 
itself of getting married serves the cautionary aspect of formalities, which 
does not exist in an opt-out model. Famously, Lon Fuller elucidated that one 
role of formalities is to caution parties before entering into a commitment.141 
Accordingly, the ritual of formalities—for example, signature or exchange 
of consideration—ensures that the parties deliberate before entering into a 
binding agreement. As Matsumura recently explained, “[c]hoice, especially 
formal choice, can highlight the seriousness of the decision to become 
married. The basic requirements of formal marriage in most states—
obtaining and recording a marriage license, often satisfying a waiting period, 
and participating in an official ceremony—all serve this cautionary function.”142 
 
139 Polikoff, supra note 28, at 372.  
140 Id. at 370.  
141 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941). 
142 Matsumura, supra note 6, at 2030.  
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Formalities also serve to make the undertaking legitimate in the eyes of 
the parties. Deliberation has a behavioral aspect. Parties are more willing to 
commit to the undertaking and take it more seriously if they contemplate the 
act. Formalities, according to David Hoffman and Zev Eigen, “are supposed 
to signal to individuals that a privately made instrument of law (a contract) 
bears the seal of the law’s formal approval, and hence the authority of 
legitimate law stands behind it.”143 They suggest that the more a promisor 
feels that the deal is legitimate, the more likely the chance that she will 
respect her undertaking.144 Given the lack of formalities, couples may 
perceive an opt-out system as illegitimate should they find themselves in a 
contract for equal division of property and spousal support, particularly if 
they wished to avoid that very situation or, as in the case of some 
interviewees, are unaware that the law even exists. The feeling of 
illegitimacy can evoke resistance. In family law cases, feelings of resistance 
may increase acrimony among partners at separation, making the process of 
division more antagonistic and affecting partners’ future interactions.145 
Because some ex-partners continue to co-parent together or have other 
reasons to remain cooperative, this sense of illegitimacy concerning the law 
runs contrary to one of the basic principles of contemporary family law.146      
Simultaneously, when couples do not know that they can opt out from 
the default rules, or when opting out is too arduous, family law does not 
serve its facilitative function. For Fuller, formalities play a facilitative role, 
as they help channel parties to the form they must follow to create legally 
binding obligations.147 For example, the writing requirement guides the 
prospective promisor about the right way to enter into an agreement. Family 
law scholarship has long emphasized facilitation as a primary function of 
domestic relations law. Facilitation should “help people organize their lives 
and affairs in the ways they prefer. Family law performs this ‘facilitative’ 
function by offering people the law’s services in entering and enforcing 
contracts, by giving legal effect to their private arrangements.”148 Indeed, an 
opt-out regime purports to serve this role, by posing clear requirements that 
should guide couples about how to tailor their own arrangements and point 
them to the specific form of opting out: a written, signed contract witnessed 
by one person. In practice, however, the BC opt-out scheme fails to enable 
 
143 David A. Hoffman & Zev J. Eigen, Contract Consideration and Behavior, 85 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 351, 386 (2017). 
144 Id.  
145 See, e.g., CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY 
RELATIONSHIPS 91, 126 (2014) (discussing the negative effects of the adversarial system on any human 
instinct for reconciliation and compromise). 
146 See id. at xii (“This approach to family disputes ignores the reality that even as legal relationships 
change—from spouse to former spouse . . . —familial connections typically endure. Divorced spouses 
continue to co-parent . . . .).  
147 Fuller, supra note 141, at 801–02.  
148 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 497 (1992). 
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feasible facilitation. Placing the burden to opt out on the couples, without 
assistance and guidance about how to do it, and imposing formal 
requirements for opting out that are rather stringent, facilitation functions 
mainly for wealthy, sophisticated partners who can have an attorney’s 
assistance. Setting a process of opting out that is quite laborious raises the 
question of whether the law’s interest is in enabling facilitation or in making 
alteration of the default grueling.149  
The fact that most interviewees did not opt out is hardly surprising, as 
the default rules in family law often serve as a de facto mandatory rule, or, 
at least, a “super-sticky” default rule. Scholarship on contract theory has 
documented the “stickiness” of default terms—or how parties to a contract 
might not alter an undesirable default rule.150 A primary obstacle to 
displacing a default term governing financial obligations is the partners’ 
cognitive bias and overoptimism. We have seen that even a trained lawyer 
with a strong interest in entering an agreement with her partner backed up 
eventually, so the hurdles to execute a contract are significant.  
High transaction costs are another obvious explanation for the default’s 
stickiness in the study’s case, for the process of executing a contract is 
onerous. It is true that parties can, with little effort, download a boilerplate 
contract. But, considering the complexity of asset division laws and spousal 
support, they would be justified in consulting a lawyer. Further, the rituals—
the signature and witness requirements—serve as deterrents to a “do-it-
yourself” type of contract, like the one that Kelley and Megan did.  
Other than the cost, the party who suggests altering the defaults might 
be concerned about their partner’s response, and for good reason. As Omri 
Ben-Shahar and John Pottow argue regarding a commercial contractual 
scenario, “[N]o matter what the default practice is, a proposal to opt out of 
it can raise a host of suspicions.”151 This is surely the case in a suggestion to 
contract around defaults in the context of financial obligations between 
intimate partners. If defaults are sticky for sophisticated commercial parties 
or those with a less intimate connection, the defaults governing relationship 
dissolution are practically adhesive. As such, the default is not a mere 
“nudge”—a mechanism that steers couples toward a particular choice rather 
than choosing for them.152 In reality, the default’s function is more akin to 
mandatory rules than gentle guidance in one direction. 
In conclusion, as it operates in the lives of unmarried couples, BC’s opt-
 
149 In Section III.C., I consider whether one objective of an opt-out regime is increasing the number 
of individuals subject to the enforcement of private support obligations.  
150 Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 19, at 655–60 (surveying previous scholarship on the 
stickiness of default rules).  
151 Id. at 653.  
152 See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 108–09 (2008) (discussing a possible change in default rule as a type 
of “nudge”).   
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out scheme leaves the choice to contract around the default rules quite 
illusory. Unless the couples are wealthy enough to afford a lawyer or are 
highly entrepreneurial, we can assume that most of them will remain married 
by default, with little opportunity to design a different regime. One of the 
fundamental problems that the law tried to address is that unmarried couples 
did not contract about their obligations and thus found themselves without 
protections at the end of their relationships. The opt-out regime did not solve 
this matter but essentially placed the burden on those who wanted to avoid 
the obligations.153 The same difficulties that existed with the previous 
system still exist, although now they fall on those who might wish to deviate 
from the default. To clarify, I do not argue that opt-out systems are 
inherently ascriptive and autonomy-violating. Rather, in Parts IV and 
Conclusion, I suggest some ways to reduce the level of ascription or at least 
the adverse effects of ascription. However, the way that the BC system is 
structured, which resembles similar suggested models in the United States, 
makes active choosing fairly unlikely.        
C. Majoritarian or Minoritarian Defaults 
This Section enquires into whether, and to what extent, the default rules 
mirror what most couples would have bargained had they been informed of 
the rules. Put differently, I aim to understand better whether the law echoes 
the common expectations of couples who live in unmarried relationships 
about the nature of their commitments, and whether the law was too 
autonomous in that regard and “march[ed] to its own drummer.”154  
Law, it is axiomatic, derives its legitimacy from mirroring the cultural 
dynamics and traditions of the time.155 Positive law often reflects a construct 
of custom and practice, on the one hand, and morality, on the other. Most 
positive laws are consistent with both: laws replicate society’s prevalent 
attitudes and stem from reason and morality. Sometimes, however, “[l]aw 
has . . . taken the lead in opposing or reforming prevailing customs or moral 
norms.”156 From the premise that law “often reproduces norms, activities, 
and relationships that exist independent of law,”157 I ask whether an opt-out 
approach serves as a majoritarian default.  
To learn about the couples’ attitudes toward the equal division of 
property and spousal support, I investigated how they manage their current 
finances and their opinions of the law that equalizes their duties to those of 
married couples. In the first set of questions I asked how they divided their 
housing costs (rent, mortgage, utilities). Living in an arrangement in which 
 
153 See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 19, at 653 (discussing the “stickiness” of out-opt regimes). 
154 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 2 (2016). 
155 BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 1–3 (2001). 
156 Id. at 7.  
157 Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity, Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of 
Legal Consciousness, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 731, 737 (1992).  
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couples contribute to the household finances based on their relative income 
(pro rata) or income pooling was a strong indication of a sharing regime and 
interdependence. Conversely, choosing to calculate an exact amount that 
each partner contributes and reimburse the other regularly was indicative of 
a separate financial regime. Separate versus shared bank accounts was 
another indication of the level of a couple’s economic independence and 
interdependence, respectively. I also interpreted partners’ intentions to be 
responsible to each other by their direct responses about whether they 
thought the properties they accumulated while together should be divided 
equally in the event of separation and whether they reached any formal or 
informal agreement about financial obligations in case of a breakup. Other 
indications of an equal-sharing regime include the creation of emotional 
interconnection and long-term commitment. 
1. The Sharers 
Surprisingly, the defaults reflect the behavior and presumed or explicit 
wishes of only about half of the interviewees. Namely, approximately half 
of interviewees live together with some form of financial sharing and 
economic interdependence.158 For this group, the defaults mimic what they 
would have chosen if they were informed about the law and bargained about 
their obligations. The law, then, is barely majoritarian.159 Only half of the 
couples I interviewed believe that, upon dissolution, the partners should 
equally divide the assets that the household added while the relationship was 
still intact and should be obligated to pay spousal support.  
I find this result surprising for two reasons. For one, another study—
although using quantitative methods—found stronger support for equal 
division of property among unmarried cohabitants. In recently reported 
research conducted in Alberta surveying 118 individuals who live in 
common-law relationships, 76% of the respondents supported equalizing 
division-of-property rules that pertain to married couples to apply to 
unmarried couples, while 24% objected.160 Second, the participants in my 
study belong to the group most likely to adopt sharing norms, as they are at 
the prime age of planning to buy property and raise children. Indeed, the 
great majority of couples said that their long-term plan was to buy real 
property. Norms of sharing would likely be different if I had interviewed 
 
 158 In two cases, I had trouble characterizing the couples’ approach. In one couple, the male 
interviewee avoided answering directly, suggesting he likely does not support equal sharing; and, 
regardless, the relationship showed some degree of financial separation and noncommitment. Another 
couple was very transparent but hesitated and had conflicting considerations.        
159 For a discussion of majoritarian default rules, see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 20, at 1592. See 
also Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 396, 429 
(2009) (suggesting that default “gap fillers cannot effectively favor the weak party”).   
160 Aleena Amjad Hafeez, Albertans’ Perceptions and Attitudes Regarding Common-Law Property 
Division Laws: Exploring Evidence from the Alberta Survey 2016, UNIV. OF ALBERTA 5, 16 (June 5, 
2017), https://www.alri.ualberta.ca/images/stories/docs/AB_cohab_survey_results.pdf. 
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elderly couples or couples with lower incomes and more couples with shared 
children in their household.161  
For some participants, it was easy to justify the equal division, as they 
based their relationships on joint venture principles: the law “make[s] sense 
because since we’ve been together, we’ve made money together, and all the 
money we’ve made on the real estate was together,” Daniella explained. 
Likewise, Richard (twenty-nine), Courtney’s partner (thirty), had 
reservations about spousal support. Still, he easily justified the norm of equal 
division and eventually even support obligations because “the argument that 
you spend so much of your time together and . . . living together, I think, 
supersedes a lot of the [arguments against equal division].” Bertha described 
a typical process in which a couple begins as two independent individuals, 
and gradually, finances become more intertwined. She reported that “our 
independent finances have been kind of just independently but . . . in the 
future . . . we think of our finances as merging, like when we consider buying 
or renting a future home, we consider buying it together . . . .”  
Predictably, the couples who raise children together full time were able 
to articulate their sharing presumption without effort or hesitation. As Emma 
(thirty-six) elucidated, “I feel like as soon as you have a child and you live 
together . . . yes, you’re married, like a child is probably the biggest 
commitment anybody would ever make.” Ethan and Kemala do not have 
children. But the option of having them one day helped them to make sense 
of the law. Ethan reasoned that “I get the logic behind it that, if someone 
took care of the kid when the other person worked, just because they didn’t 
pay the mortgage doesn’t mean they don’t have any right to the property.” 
At the same time, raising a child when only one of the partners is a legal 
parent can make the sharing presumption more doubtful. Wakeford, who is 
divorced, has joint custody, and lives with Bertha, acknowledged that equal 
sharing is more complicated because “we’ve always had some concession, 
because I have a child, that we don’t—well, so far, we don’t consider that 50/50.”  
Some sharers expressed the idea that the law’s timeline (two years) kicks 
in too late.162 For them, the law mirrors their arrangement but might 
commence later than their needs arise. Two couples moved in together after 
long periods of dating (three years in one instance and six in the other) and 
bought property together right away. For a third couple, the female partner 
moved from England to live with her partner, and after a few months, they 
bought a home together. In all these cases, the two-year rule rendered the 
law underinclusive, as the couples adopted sharing regimes before two years 
of living together. Kelley and Megan, who dated for six years prior to 
 
161 Elderly couples often do not get married because of pressure from their children to avoid 
comingling finances and thus endangering the children’s inheritance. There are other incentives to avoid 
sharing, such as possible loss of state benefits and spousal support. See Aloni, supra note 7, at 1329.  
162 Family Law Act Questions and Answers, supra note 126, at 3 (“Couples who have lived together in a 
marriage-like relationship for two years are treated the same under the Family Law Act as married couples.”). 
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moving in together, said, “we would rather not have had to wait the two 
years” before the law considered them spouses. These partners were still 
able to claim equal division based on unjust enrichment principles, but this 
is a more challenging legal claim than relying on the “marriage-like” 
relationship presumption that the law provides.163      
2. The Non-sharers 
Nevertheless, around half of the couples I interviewed expressed an 
attitude that I interpret as rejecting equal division of assets and support 
obligations upon separation. Interestingly, it was significantly easier to 
characterize couples as rejecting the defaults, as they often expressed an 
unequivocal attitude, and their behavior was strongly indicative of such an 
approach. A few couples have purposefully created a distinct financial 
separation: each partner had an independent bank account; they calculated 
exactly how much each person contributed to the household; and each 
partner generally had a sense that the other had their own separate financial 
obligations. As Robert (thirty-five) noted, “It was clear from both of us that 
we wanted to keep separate bank accounts and a lot of the finances separate. 
So, we built a system based on that.” 
Notably, the practice of separate financial regimes often correlated with 
couples who expressed a sentiment that they are not confident in their 
relationship’s future and are not ready to get married. Robert stated,  
For me, at least the initial part of the relationship of moving 
in, to keep separate accounts was more of a safeguard if things 
didn’t work out between us. I had lived with a previous 
partner, and obviously, things didn’t work out there . . . . So . 
. . the thinking behind it was to kind of safeguard myself from 
the worst-case scenario. 
 Caroline, his partner, expressed a similar sentiment: “Seeing a lot of 
relationships, other peoples’ relationships breaking up and how difficult it 
can be to sort of untangle it financially and not wanting to go through that, 
that was probably the biggest reason, I guess.” When asked later why they 
do not get married, they both indicated that they are not ready for this 
commitment yet. Robert connected marriage with the separate financial regime:  
I think that we’re probably not at the point in our lives where 
we would want to make that change at the moment. I would 
think that there would be a better time in the future for that . . 
. . We’ve been living together for a bit but also looking at it we 
haven’t lived together for that long and, you can’t get divorced 
 
163 See Leckey, supra note 94, at 72, 74 (explaining that in certain jurisdictions, “unjust enrichment 
offers former cohabitants their best recourse under the general private law,” and some jurisdictions have 
extended “the presumption of equal division of family property” to “those cohabitants qualifying as 
‘spousal’ or ‘marriage-like’”). 
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if you don’t get married, so . . . if we were to break up, things 
would be probably a little less messy than if we had to formally 
file for divorce.  
Similarly, Emily (twenty-nine) and Gareth (thirty), seasonal workers in 
Whistler’s buzzing leisure and tourism industry, practice a strict financial-
separation regime and also linked their nonmarriage to nonsharing. 
According to Emily, being married would mean a stronger commitment, 
including financial commitment. In her words, if they were to get married, 
“I would tend more to make longer-term commitments . . . and more joint 
commitments, and I think we would pool our finances more.” But, 
meanwhile, as they are not there yet, the separate regime is beneficial to her 
because “it’s nice to have that autonomy” [to do whatever she wants with 
her money]. Matthew (thirty-three) mentioned to Jessica (twenty-eight) a 
few occasions in which he had paid more than she had on some household 
expenses, and stated, “For me, fair would mean you get what you brought, I 
get what I brought. And that’s not 50/50, so to break it down 50/50, I feel 
like that wouldn’t be fair.” And Jessica opined about equal sharing, “I think 
that if he paid for it, or even though I paid a little bit, but he paid more, I 
would think that he would take it ‘cause that was his, that’s your stuff.” This 
couple, as well, showed hesitation toward commitment and indicated that 
marriage would be the next level of commitment, but they were not ready to 
take this step yet.  
Two couples with low incomes were explicit about their reasons for 
keeping money separate. In one case, the couple stayed unmarried purposely 
to avoid sharing the debt of the male partner. Linda (thirty-two) and Bob 
(thirty-six) have been best friends for years. When Linda bought a home 
(because rent was too expensive), she invited Bob to join her as a platonic 
roommate to help pay the mortgage. Later, their relationship started to 
change because Linda wanted to have sexual relations with Bob; eventually, 
they became a couple. Bob and Linda commingle their finances and share 
their lives quite extensively. However, Linda does not want to get married, 
mainly because she does not want to be responsible for Bob’s debt. Bob has 
an eight-year-old child who lives in a different jurisdiction and an unstable 
job. Linda stated that getting married will be “stressful” because Bob “has 
debt, and I will have to take responsibility for that, and I don’t want to. So, 
I will be resentful [of that if we get married].” When it comes to equal 
sharing of properties, Linda also objects. She agrees that Bob deserves some 
part of the appreciation of the property’s value, and she would not leave Bob 
“high and dry.” However, she does not think that Bob should be entitled to 
half of the property’s appreciation.  
Although Molly and Lainey are not low-income, Lainey is also 
concerned about liability for Molly’s debt. Molly is about to return to school, 
and Lainey wants to avoid debt for her education expenses. She said they 
might need to execute an agreement because “I don’t have debt, and she 
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[Molly] does, and I guess that’s a risk for me.” Erin (the lawyer) expressed 
a similar sentiment, as she does not think it is fair to share the increase in 
property value and Williams’s student debt. Accordingly, she stated,  
I was a little bit concerned because I find it a bit odd that 
[obligation] backdates from the date of cohabitation when you 
start, when you become common law, so basically, my place 
increased in value pretty significantly in 2016, 2017, 2018 . . . . 
And then he’s also got student debt, and so I don’t want to be 
on the hook for that. 
The other couple with a low income, Nicole (thirty-two) and James 
(twenty-seven), have practical and ideological reasons to adopt a strict 
separation regime. In Nicole’s words: “[Our finances are] so very, very 
separate. He pays his own cell phone bill; I pay my own cell phone bill.” 
One major incentive for their separation is that James is a recipient of 
disability benefits as he is on the autism spectrum. Nicole commented,  
The legal problem, I think once you start mixing that kind of 
stuff personally, I think it’s harder to prove things legally . . . 
it seems like a headache that I just don’t want to deal with so 
that’s why, one reason that . . . we just have separate financial 
situations, so it’s just not pertinent to mix, like he’s on 
disability and I work, so I keep my paychecks, he keeps his 
disability payments, and being in an abled/disabled 
relationship, that’s pretty firmly separate . . . . 
Besides their issue with losing social assistance, their reason is also 
ideological. James defined himself as a “men’s rights activist,” and Nicole 
is a feminist.164 While their ideologies are potentially conflicting,165 they share 
the same conclusion when it comes to financial issues. James put forward that 
being a men’s rights activist “really is what it sounds like, like all I want is for 
both men and women to be equal under the law . . . .” Nicole elaborated on 
James’s position while explaining how it corresponds with her views:  
[H]e’s concerned with men being saddled with things like 
alimony payments, he doesn’t think that it’s ethical that men 
tend to end up with those legally quite often because they are 
the higher earners, but, personally, I feel really similarly on the 
opposite end of the spectrum. I don’t think anybody should be 
 
164 See Rachel M. Schmitz and Emily Kazyak, Masculinities in Cyberspace: An Analysis of 
Portrayals of Manhood in Men’s Rights Activist Websites, 5 SOC. SCI. 1, 1 (2016) (explaining that men’s 
rights activists “seek to establish resources for men to utilize in maintaining their elevated position in 
society in relation to women and other social minorities”).  
165 See id. (detailing how men’s rights activism conflict with feminism, “men’s right activist groups 
focus increasingly on the toxic consequences of feminism on men’s lives, leading to a distinctive anti-
feminist framework”). 
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paying to take care of me, either, if that makes sense. 
Alexandra (thirty-six), about to graduate from her PhD program in 
science, is another individual who practices clear separation and adopts a 
language of self-reliance. She mentioned, “I say I’m independent and I can 
support myself right . . . . I wouldn’t expect because I have my job, I have 
my career, I can support myself, I don’t expect anyone else to support me.”   
In conclusion, for approximately half of the couples I interviewed, the 
defaults of equal sharing reflect their presumed intention—at least, those 
they are ready to admit to when their partner is sitting next to them, when 
they are not in conflict, and when, for many of them, it is the first time they 
have learned about the law. Considering this is the age group most likely to 
create economic interdependencies, our findings call for more research into 
the law’s effects on cohabitant groups who are less likely to merge finances 
and become interdependent.  
D. The Making of a Norm 
I could have ended the analysis here and concluded that the law, at least 
as applicable to couples in my sample, is not strongly majoritarian. 
However, as these couples’ perceptions are hard to distinguish from the 
law’s effects, my analysis would be superficial and incomplete if I failed to 
consider how the law’s expressive and constitutive aspects shape couples’ 
expectations. Then, I explore the extent that the couples’ views about 
sharing, as expressed in the interviews, are also shaped by the norm that the 
defaults announce and whether the law also spreads a variation of traditional 
marital norms. It comes as no surprise that the “[l]aw deflects society; but 
society is reflected in the law.”166 This study suggests that an opt-out 
approach sometimes infuses norms and sharpens legal entitlements and 
expectations. 
One main obstacle I encountered in ascertaining the expressive effect is 
the large number of couples who are unaware of the law. There is an 
interplay between one’s awareness of the law and its expressive function. 
Unawareness of the law reduces its expressive operation.    
Yet, when couples knew about the law—or some aspects of it—I found 
sufficient indications that the law served as more than the reflection of their 
perceived obligations; the law also conveyed norms. The interviews indicate 
that the law propagates the norm of equal sharing through a few 
mechanisms. To the extent they knew about the law, the participants 
absorbed the norms that the law implies. Couples might think that if the law 
adopts the norm that couples should share gains and losses after two years 
of cohabitation, then it mirrors a typical pattern that is fair. This is 
particularly true for couples who thought the regime was mandatory. 
 
166 K. N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1283 (1932).  
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Interestingly, couples who thought there was no way to opt out typically had 
a strong understanding of the law (they knew of the two years and realized 
that it means an equal division of property and obligations to pay spousal 
support in case of breakup). For them, we can assume a strong effect of the 
law in communicating norms. Emma had a robust understanding of the law, 
although she did not know that opting out is an option. Originally from 
France, Nathan moved to Vancouver for work and met Emma; they now live 
in BC and have a child together. He learned about the law from Emma. For 
Nathan, coming from another country, the law at first sounded utterly 
foreign. He stated,  
I had no clue, and I listen to what [Emma] said . . . and I said, 
okay, sure. I was also amazed about how you speed up in 
Canada when you’re common law . . . and I was amazed by 
that because [it is] very different from France’s system. 
 However, the law grew on him, and, especially after having a child, he 
learned to accept this norm. He described his ambivalence and process of 
coming to terms with the law as follows: “I was kind of worried at first, but 
. . . like being in a relationship, it’s a risk and I had to accept the rules, and 
that’s it.” Ethan, Kemala’s partner, also spoke of a process of resistance to 
acceptance. Initially, when he learned about the law in 2013, he recollected,  
I was single; I was initially kind of horrified; I was, like, what 
the heck, what if two people don’t want to get married. I was 
in the mindset of, wow, that’s like a huge risk to move in with 
someone, so I was very initially against it. And then, yeah, it 
kind of became exactly like [Kemala] said, this actually works 
out, this is a big benefit as opposed to living in a country like 
[where Kemala is originally from] which, you might not even 
be able to sign a lease together. 
 Ethan’s tolerance for the law, it seems, developed due to his ability to 
sponsor Kemala as a permanent resident after merely one year of living 
together. Appreciating the recognition of their relationships by the federal 
government influenced how he felt about other laws that govern unmarried 
partners’ relationships.    
Some couples also understand the two-year threshold as signifying that 
the level of commitment ought to evolve—a sort of deadline that signals the 
end of a deliberation period. After this, the couple’s inner status changes and 
becomes closer to a traditional marriage model. Diter put this directly: “I 
feel like it takes away a lot of the importance ‘cause you’re already forced 
to commit, especially when you sign an agreement like I did.” The reality 
for him is that the law “forced [him] to commit.” Similarly, for the engineers, 
who knew the law reasonably well, the law had a symbolic effect on their 
relationship. The male partner articulated that if the law labels them 
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“spouses,” then the meaning is that the couple should behave accordingly. 
He did not “expect anything to change when [they’re] actually married . . . . 
[I]f you are married according to the law, that, to me is the commitment. So, 
I think what the two years—I knew of the two years coming up,” and they 
served as equivalent to being married.   
Sometimes, the recognition of unmarried relationships channels marital-
like behavior in more concrete and practical ways. In Antonio and Andrea’s 
case, to apply for permanent residency as a couple, they opened a joint bank 
account as a means “to prove that we’re a real relationship . . . it was a way 
also to show that, yes, we are together.” The act of opening a joint bank 
account accelerated the sharing regime that now regulates their relationship. 
This is also the case for Ethan and Kemala, who opened up a bank account 
(for which they had no use) to demonstrate the sincerity of their relationship 
to the immigration agency. Initially, only Ethan deposited money into it. 
Thus, he elaborated, “early last year we opened that and then we started 
using it, and I started putting money in there and just paying bills out of that 
account even though it was just my money.” This action opened the door to 
more financial sharing, so the bank gave Kemala “a debit card, and then I 
added her as an authorized user on my main credit card and we just, once a 
month we go over the budget, we put in all our expenses.” Later on, Kemala 
started to deposit her salary into this joint bank account.  
The law’s constitutive aspect helps some partners justify, sometimes 
even to defend, their legal entitlement or their “bargaining endowment.”167 
The law equips each partner with the language to articulate an entitlement to 
equal division or to justify and rationalize the law. Some interviews 
indicated couples (or individual partners) had internalized the norms of the 
law and are also familiar with the justifications for earlier legal protections 
of the primary-caregiver spouse in case of a breakup. Some use these 
concepts to defend this law. As Emma explained, “I personally think that is 
a good thing, I think that it benefits women in potentially a situation that has 
not benefited women in the past, so I kind of like it.” For Emma, then, the 
opt-out reform is an evolution of previous laws that dealt with obligations 
between married couples; and her understanding of the law derives from 
preexisting versions of laws with similar functions.  
Some couples, then, have adopted what Yvonne Zylan, a sociologist of 
law, calls “justificatory narratives”—articulating terms that describe, in 
legalese, social claims or entitlements, and justify state intervention based 
on a “legitimacy-conferring” framework that was proffered by previous 
claim-justifying discourses.168 These terms invite the law to intervene and 
 
167 See Mark Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 7 (1981) (explaining that “[t]he bargaining endowment which courts bestow on 
the parties includes not only the substantive entitlements conferred by legal rules, but also rules that 
enable those entitlements to be vindicated”). 
168 YVONNE ZYLAN, STATES OF PASSION: LAW, IDENTITY, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
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make “common-law partner” a legal category deserving of the state’s use of 
ascription.169 In some of the partners’ minds, knowing about the law fortifies 
the idea that they are entitled to a remedy. One cohabitant explained how the 
law helps, or will help, in a case of a breakup, to assess their obligations: 
“[W]e’re aware of the Act, we’re aware of the law . . . . [I]f we do end our 
relationship . . . we [will] rely on the Act to guide us.” One interviewee 
explained how knowing the law would have helped her to claim a benefit: 
“And also if that system reminded you that, at this point, you are now 
considered spouses, that would help people to realize that there are all these 
benefits that you can now start using because you are spouses.” The law, 
then, has a constitutive power in establishing expectations between partners 
as well as between partners and third parties.  
Studies about the impact of default rules on the status quo provide 
another vehicle to understand the extent to which the law broadcasts norms 
of sharing and commitment. Studies on status quo bias abound. These sets 
of behavioral-economy experiments test the hypothesis that, all things being 
equal, people prefer to maintain their status quo rather than to modify their 
situation.170 Research finds ample evidence for the bias (in favor of status 
quo) and, in particular, regarding default rules. Russell Korobkin famously 
argues that “when lawmakers anoint a contract term the default, the 
substantive preferences of contracting parties shift—that term becomes 
more desirable, and other competing terms becoming less desirable.”171 For 
the few couples that knew about and understood the legal regime, the law 
seems to have this effect: if they get to talk about their commitments and 
obligations, the law serves as a legitimizing source, reflecting that their 
sharing regime is in line with the norm. Logan, who entered into a 
cohabitation agreement with Olivia, explained the legitimizing effect of the 
default rules: “there wasn’t anything in [the contract] that I was super against 
because of the fact that it follows the current Act pretty well, so . . . .” Here 
is an example, then, of how couples negotiate cohabitation agreements in the 
shadow of the law.  
Overall, the default barely “reflects what most people would choose if 
they were adequately informed.”172 In any event, this rule is sometimes “too 
crude” in that it brings together heterogeneous groups of sharing and 
commitment practices.173 The law diffuses particular cultural understandings 
of obligations, which might be unexpected for people from non-Canadian 
 
DESIRE 58–59 (2011).  
169 See Ménard, supra note 135, at 62 (defining common-law partners as “partners who live together 
in a conjugal relationship”). 
170 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 
611–12 (1998). 
171 Id. at 611. 
172 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, CHOOSING NOT TO CHOOSE: UNDERSTANDING THE VALUE OF CHOICE 
73 (2015) (emphasis omitted).  
173 Id. at 77.   
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legal cultures, such as immigrants. And when known to the couples, the law 
plays a role in establishing and justifying legal entitlement for equal sharing 
and spousal support.    
IV. FUNCTION, PRIVATIZATION, AND MENUS 
Drawing on the analysis of the opt-out regime in Part III, this Part zooms 
out to examine what insights the couples’ experiences can provide regarding 
the scholarly and policy debate in the United States. As the following 
discussion suggests, both supporters and critics of the opt-out regime missed 
the mark on the consequences of the approach. Section A argues that 
functionalists fail to appreciate that the regime creates semi-statuses, with 
inadequate regard to the couple’s actual familial function. Section B 
contends that traditionalists dramatize an opt-out scheme’s effects on 
marriage and the family law system altogether. Finally, both sides 
underappreciate how the opt-out model promotes privatization of dependency.  
A. A Menu of Marriages 
Literature supporting an opt-out regime labels it as “functional”—
meaning, a legal scheme that does not determine legal consequences of 
relationships based on formalities (such as a written agreement, registration, 
or marriage certificate) but rather on the family’s function.174 As Nancy 
Polikoff, in endorsing the ALI Principles, submits, an opt-out scheme advances 
“inclusion within the law of all relationships that achieve the law’s purpose.”175  
The main flaw in labeling an opt-out system as advancing functional 
qualities is that, in practice, the scheme establishes what scholars have 
traditionally referred to as “statuses.”176 Although the definition of “status” 
is complex and a subject of some disagreement, for the purpose of this 
Article it is sufficient to use its basic definitions to illustrate that an opt-out 
regime creates a legal situation akin to status.177 Black’s Law Dictionary has 
two definitions of status that are relevant here. One, “[a] person’s legal 
condition regarding personal rights but excluding proprietary relations <the 
 
174 For a definition of functionalism, see Edward Stein, Looking Beyond Full Relationship 
Recognition for Couples Regardless of Sex: Abolition, Alternatives, and/or Functionalism, 28 L. & INEQ. 
345, 365 (2010) (“Under this approach, the characteristics of a relationship—rather than, or in addition 
to, its formal legal status—determine how a relationship should be treated under the law.”). 
175 Polikoff, supra note 28, at 366.  
176 For a discussion of the meaning of “status” as concerning marriage, see Hanoch Dagan & 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Reinterpreting the Status-Contract Divide: The Case of Fiduciaries, in CONT, 
STATUS, & FIDUCIARY L. 51, (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016); Libby Adler, Inconceivable: 
Status, Contract, and the Search for a Legal Basis for Gay & Lesbian Parenthood, 123 PENN ST. L. REV. 
1, 25–26 (2018).  
177 As mentioned previously, supra note 37, I prefer to treat marriage as its effects. The discussion 
of “status” here is solely a response to the argument that an opt-out regime shifts the law from status to 
function.  
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status of a father> <the status of a wife>.”178 Two, “[a] person’s legal 
condition insofar as it is imposed by the law without the person’s consent, 
as opposed to a condition that the person has acquired by agreement <the 
status of a slave>.”179  
Under these two definitions, to a great extent, the opt-out regime in BC 
acts like it establishes a status rather than screening for function. Unless they 
contract out, most couples find themselves in a “legal condition regarding 
personal rights,” sometimes even “imposed by the law without the person’s 
consent.”180 As I argue in Section III.A.2., the contractual approach fails to 
provide an effective way to opt out. The system’s reliance on contractual 
instruments means that most couples subscribe to (or find themselves 
abiding by) the default rules, in lieu of an affirmative undertaking or, in some 
cases, even without tacit consent. In the absence of a more user-friendly 
mechanism to opt out, the notion that unmarried couples can choose not to 
live in an “ascribed marriage” is a fiction. The opt-out approach, then, 
imposes a “status” on most individuals. Indeed, Grace Ganz Blumberg, one 
of the ALI Principles’ reporters, described its approach as “status-based.”181  
Theoretically, the opt-out model is functional because it applies only to 
couples who meet the criteria of living in “marriage-like” relationships. 
Thus, the argument goes, unmarried couples can avoid the ascription ex-ante 
by not living in marriage-like relationships and ex-post by proving that their 
relationships did not resemble marriage and they do not qualify as 
spouses.182 However, there are multiple problems in relying on the standard-
made formulation of “marriage-like” to cultivate the scheme’s functionality 
and avoid misclassifications. First, “marriage-like” is a vague standard that 
leaves plenty of room for judicial discretion.183 Just as marriage today has 
many forms, “marriage-like” encompasses various configurations. As one 
Saskatchewan trial court put it:  
 
 
178 Status, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: Rights and 
Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1265, 1273 (2001) (“Other 
jurisdictions and authorities have taken the path of status rather than contract . . . .”). Other commentators 
frequently treat the opt-out approach as status-based. See, e.g., Mary Coombs, Insiders and Outsiders: 
What the American Law Institute Has Done for Gay and Lesbian Families, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 87, 101 (2001) (“In contrast, the Principles choose to adopt an explicitly equitable, status-
based approach . . . .”).  
182 See, e.g., Leckey, supra note 94, at 140–41 (explaining how individuals must show that they 
have “cohabited ‘as spouses’ or ‘in a marriage-like relationship’”).  
183 See id. (explaining that the definition of spouse is “qualitative” and that individuals “must have 
cohabited . . . ‘in a marriage-like relationship.’” Also explaining how there are “disputes regarding the 
nature and duration” of cohabitations and the “need to prove the nature and duration of the relationship 
complicates assumptions that reform will ease the evidentiary burden linked, pre-reform, with claims in 
unjust enrichment”). 
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Spousal relationships are many and varied. Individuals in spousal 
relationships, whether they are married or not, structure their 
relationships differently. . . . Because of the variety of relationships, no 
one factor can be determinative of the issue of whether a spousal 
relationship actually exists. All relevant factors must be weighed to 
reach such a determination . . . .184  
 
Due to the flexibility of the standard, few couples without written 
contract can predict that their relationships will not meet the test of 
“marriage-like.” Despite the critique that courts have considered primarily 
traditional relationships as married-like, courts have also been willing to 
consider as “marriage-like” relationships in which the couples kept a 
financial separation regime or do not live together any longer.185 While these 
outcomes, in my view, have been justified in the specific cases, they point 
to the indeterminacy of this regime, as well as to the reasonable chance that 
a couple will satisfy the standard of living in a marriage-like relationship. 
Second, in any event, in case of dispute, the burden of litigating is heavy and 
costly. A partner might prefer to reach a settlement rather than going to trial 
to prove their relationship was not “marriage-like.” Third, as I discussed 
previously, the law promotes the norms of conjugality by formalizing the 
notion that partners are entitled to an equal division of property and spousal 
support upon separation. Therefore, the chances of being in a non-marriage-like 
relationship are even smaller, as partners might absorb the law’s precept that 
equal division and spousal support obligations are the expected norm and find 
that they are entitled to such an arrangement. From the standpoint of Holmes’s 
bad man,186 we might even speculate that one partner could take advantage of 
the background rules that create an expectation of compensation.187  
In summation, the result of the regime’s contractualization, with the 
elusive definition of “marriage-like,” undermines the argument that an opt-
out scheme classifies relationships based on their function. Effectively, an 
opt-out system brings in marriage through the back door, creating a world 
where most couples who live together for more than two years are 
considered spouses for property division and spousal support purposes.  
Supporters of an opt-out regime also justify it as protective of women. 
As Bowman puts forward when advocating an opt-out approach in the 
United States, “[i]ndividuals in such [unmarried] families, especially women 
and children, are likely to be left in a vulnerable economic position if the 
 
184 Yakiwchuk v. Oaks, 2003 SKQB 124, para. 10, 15 (Can.). 
185 Weber v. Leclerc, 2015 BCCA 492, para. 21, 27 (holding that economic dependence or 
interdependence is only one factor in determining “marriage-like,” and relationships that are not 
economically dependent can be recognized as “marriage-like”).   
186 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459.  
187 See Janet Halley, Conclusion: Distribution and Decision: Assessing Governance Feminism, in 
GOVERNANCE FEMINISM: AN INTRODUCTION 253–54 (2018) (suggesting how to do “distributional 
analysis” and detailing how one element is “separating is from ought”) (citation omitted). 
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union is ended by separation or death.”188 There is no question that because 
women typically contribute more unpaid labor to the household and are often 
the primary care providers for children, they are more likely to be harmed 
by a breakup.189 Without rules of equal division of property and spousal 
support obligations, the primary care provider might be left without 
properties that the family, as a joint venture, created and grew in value. There 
is no doubt that the opt-out approach assists some women, especially those 
in relationships with traditional gender roles, in receiving their fair share in 
the household family property.  
Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether, and to what extent, an 
opt-out approach supports all women. This is because the risk of 
misclassification might be harmful to some women, particularly to women 
with low incomes and low wealth. In recent years, sociology and 
demography scholarship has documented that women in the United States 
do not get married because they are concerned that their male partners are 
financially unstable, and these women are not willing to assume 
responsibility for the debt (or future debt) of their partners.190 For instance, 
in a recent study of never-married individuals, 78% of female participants 
indicated that finding a partner with a steady job is very important to them.191 
Indeed, recall that it was the reason Linda (one of the interviewees) did not 
marry Bob.192 Unfortunately for Linda, the FLA equally divides debt 
incurred during relationships. While Bob had incurred some of his debt 
before his relationship with Linda, Bob incurred other debt while they were 
living together. Although Linda did not marry Bob precisely because she 
wished to avoid sharing his debt, they lived in a marriage-like relationship 
(per their statement in the interview and based on my analysis of their 
relationship, as described). For Linda and women with low income and low 
wealth , the opt-out system might be detrimental.  
 Simultaneously, the opt-out approach might be—or is even likely to 
 
188 Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual 
Cohabitation, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 2 (2007).     
189 Women still perform more housework and carework than their male counterparts. Despite major 
changes in women’s participation in the paid labor force, it is still the reality that, especially in households 
with children, specialization of carework is prevalent. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
in 2011, 64.2% of mothers with children under six years participated in the labor force, compared with 
76.5% of mothers with children six to seventeen years of age. Twenty-seven percent of employed women 
usually worked part time, while only 11% of men did. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., WOMEN IN THE 
LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK (2013) (providing statistics for women in the labor force); Cynthia Lee 
Starnes, Lovers, Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 
ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 207 (2012) (“The primary family responsibilities that lead married mothers to limit 
paid employment go far in explaining the motherhood penalty.”).  
190 See e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 8, at 100 (“Women see themselves as assuming primary 
responsibility for children, and if a man is not pulling his own weight in the relationship, he may detract 
from the woman’s ability to provide for herself and the children.”).  
191 Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RES. CTR. 
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocial-trends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married/. 
192 See supra Section III.C.  
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be—disadvantageous to women who execute an agreement concerning 
financial obligations. When BC promulgated the law, it also modified the 
rules concerning courts’ review of contracts. The FLA adopted a less 
interventionist approach than its predecessor, lessening the court’s authority 
to set aside domestic contracts.193 While before the reform, the court was 
able to set aside a contract upon finding unfairness, the new threshold for 
intervention is “significant unfairness.”194 The result is that women who 
enter into an agreement that gives them only a few rights in the property will 
have slimmer chances of successfully challenging that agreement. The 
scheme thus strengthens predictability while diminishing judges’ discretion 
and making the excuse of obligation more difficult. Because those who 
execute contracts are likely those with significant properties, wealthy 
women will be worse off in this regime than before. This is especially true 
because parties bargain in the shadow of the default rules, so it is unlikely 
that they will get much more than the default rules grant them; put 
differently, those rules more or less set the framework for what each partner 
expects to get.195  
Moreover, importantly, the default rules are not optimal for the 
economically weaker partner.196 The strengthening of contract enforceability 
in an opt-out regime is not unique to BC. The basic principle of a regime 
that imposes default rules that establish obligations between the partners is 
to enable parties to opt out with a degree of certainty. We can reasonably 
predict that every state that adopts an opt-out regime will accompany it with 
rules that reduce courts’ authority to review contracts that met procedural 
requirements.197  
Further, not only does the opt-out regime fail to promote functional 
family law or assist women of all economic classes, it also stands in 
contradiction to a well-developed menu of regulatory regimes for legal 
recognition of relationships.198 The idea of such a menu of options means 
commitment to the “recognition of a variety of supportive family forms 
offering persons of all sexes and orientations the opportunity to structure 
 
193 See, e.g., Asselin v. Roy, [2013] BCSC 1681, para. 124 (Can.) (“The tenor of the 
new Act appears to favour a less interventionist approach than its predecessor, the FRA.”).  
194 Id. at para. 128 (“Under the previous legislation, a finding of unfairness based on one of 
enumerated factors in s. 65(1) was sufficient to allow the court to, in effect, rewrite the parties’ 
Agreement to achieve the fairness found lacking in the original version.”).  
195 See Galanter, supra note 167, at 27–28 (discussing the presence of customary laws, lurking in 
the “shadows,” throughout history). Of course, the bargaining endowments do not exclude the option that 
the prenuptial agreement will grant more than the default. Still, at least the default rules stand as a general 
guideline for what the parties can reasonably expect. 
196 See Aloni, supra note 56, at 353–54 (providing an example of how default rules disadvantage 
the economically weaker partner).  
 197 Cf., id. at 349–53 (discussing the connection between procedural and substantive requirements 
in domestic agreements).  
198 See Stein, supra note 174, at 360 (defining such a menu as “the development of a plurality of 
relationship-recognition alternatives that includes, but is not limited to, marriage”).  
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their families and live their lives as best suits them.”199 This menu of 
regulatory options refers to establishing various legal mechanisms, beyond 
marriage, to enable couples to organize the consequences of their mutual 
lives. For example, a menu can include an additional registration scheme 
(like a civil union or domestic partnership) that helps couples who do not 
wish to get married to organize their mutual obligations. Such a system 
responds to the needs of diverse types of families, composed of different 
commitment levels and varied legal needs.        
The menu of options in BC does not come close to this description. The 
system nudges couples into one of three options: be single, live in a non-
solemnized marriage, or live in a solemnized marriage. A fourth option—
shaping one’s unique preferences—is dependent on contracts and thus 
becomes costly and difficult to accomplish. The result is a menu composed 
of marriage in different forms, and only a little more flexibility for 
individuals and couples who can use contracts to achieve it. 
This limited menu is not an issue that is unique to BC; rather, every opt-
out model that is so ascriptive will adversely affect the other institutions on 
the menu and will de facto prevent a meaningful menu from developing. 
This is because one of the basic principles of a well-functioning menu is that 
it should not offer options that neutralize other options in a way that, de 
facto, decreases choice. In other words, for a menu of options to be 
successful, the options should correlate with each other. The options need to 
be tangential: they can touch the boundaries of each other but not take over 
one another.200 In a system with an opt-out option, because all rights and 
benefits are already granted to unmarried couples, they have little reason to 
enter into a different legal institution or to negotiate the legal effects of their 
relationships. This makes the addition of any potential registration scheme 
useless. If couples have no motivation to register, any other institution on 
the menu will be unserviceable (couples will not use it because it does not 
offer an extra value).201  
BC’s menu of options—if we can even use this term in the case of BC—
is better called a “menu of marriages.” The words of Halley, describing the 
considerably less ascriptive system in the United States, fit well here: this 
system is “less emphatic about choice, more regulatory, more governmental 
in the Foucaultian sense than a real menu of options.”202 
 
199 Case, supra note 42, at 1772.  
200 For more on the “menu of options” for legal recognition of relationships, see Aloni, supra note 
43, at 599.  
201 The worldwide experience with civil unions and domestic partnerships teaches that when the 
institutions on the menu do not offer an extra value mimic other institutions, couples are unlikely to select 
them. That experience clearly demonstrates that civil unions are only a burden on family law, and couples 
rarely choose them as an alternative to other forms of regulatory choices. “With the exception of France 
and Belgium . . . registered partnerships generally are not a popular option among opposite-sex couples. 
Nor are they very popular among same-sex couples.” Id. at 600.   
202 Halley, supra note 37, at 32 (emphasis in original).  
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B. The End or the Revival of Marriage 
For precisely these reasons, traditionalist scholarship’s strong resistance 
to an opt-out model is puzzling. Critics of the ALI Principles argue that an 
opt-out regime will undermine marriage. Lynn Wardle’s critique is typical; 
accordingly, the ALI Principles “significantly weaken the institution of 
marriage.”203 Wardle states that having marriage alternatives will encourage 
individuals to choose “the dangerous alternative of nonmarital domestic 
partnership if it is legalized.”204 Other appraisals add that preferring marriage 
to institutionalized cohabitation is imperative because “evidence strongly 
suggests that the marital advantage is real and that it persists across national, 
cultural, and socioeconomic boundaries.”205 Traditionalist scholarship 
further contends that “conscriptive schemes conflict with social policies 
favoring formal marriage and marital childbearing by suggesting that public 
support for marriage is declining.”206  
But an opt-out regime, to the extent that couples actually know about it 
(which is doubtful), can send an even stronger message of support for 
marriage and the norms attendant to the institution. In view of that, it does 
not matter whether one formally marries or not; after two years, couples 
should adopt marital norms. In practice, the opt-out approach does not 
undermine marriage; it endorses marital commitment to its largest extent. 
The opt-out regime, which deems most people as married regardless of 
whether they are registered or not, brings marriage through the back door, 
contributing to the rearticulation of the traditional family as the site of 
caregiving and support. Indeed, it brings marriage back to its glory days, in 
which most people were married. In an opt-out regime, marriage is so 
important that it serves as the default framework for most intimate 
relationships.  
The interviews confirm that BC’s opt-out approach did not undermine 
marriage in the sense of traditionalists’ concern. Generally speaking, at least 
half of the interviewees mentioned that they plan on getting married at some 
future point. For some, although they were legally recognized as spouses, 
marriage still serves as an additional step in signaling commitment. 
Courtney and Richard are an excellent example. Both identify as 
polyamorous, Courtney is once divorced, and Richard has a child from a 
previous partner. Richard is an ideological cohabitant who does not believe 
in marriage. Yet, Courtney explains that marriage is still important to her for 
practical and symbolic matters. Practically, she said: 
 
203 Wardle, supra note 90, at 1226–27. 
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205 Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. 
L.Q. 309, 328 (2008). For a similar argument, see, for example, Margaret F. Brinig, Domestic 
Partnership: Missing the Target?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 23–24 (2002) (arguing that “cohabitation 
does not promote ‘economic efficiency’ in the same way marriage does”). 
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[M]arriage is a really easy way to make sure all of your bases 
are covered in like the event of an emergency. . . . You don’t 
need a piece of paper that says that you love each other, you 
need the piece of paper that says automatically without filing 
30 different other pieces of paper that really you’re never 
going to get around to filing that makes sure that that person 
has the rights that they need in an emergency.  
On the symbolic level, marriage still holds a particular significance in 
society. Thus, common-law status, according to Courtney,   
doesn’t have the more automatic sort of respect. One of 
[Richard’s] family members had a Christmas dinner, and 
boyfriends and girlfriends weren’t invited. Had we been 
actually married, there’s no way in hell they would have not 
invited me. But because we’re not actually married in their 
eyes, I’m just his girlfriend.  
Couples in which both partners did not wish to get married had various 
reasons, all in line with the general reasons that people cohabit. Some were 
waiting for more financial stability before they take this step. For others, 
marriage meant a ceremony that is costly (although they can register with 
the province with minimal cost) and thus unnecessary. Others opposed 
marriage from an ideological standpoint. Yet, these couples who expressed 
no desire to get married for the reasons I listed typically manifested 
commitment levels no different from those who wished to get married. 
Overall, the law did not have the effect of steering these couples away from 
marriage. Those who do not wish to get married, although living in 
committed long-term relationships, were not motivated by the law not to do 
so, at least not consciously.           
Traditionalists are further apprehensive that marriage alternatives create 
confusion that further undermines marriage.207 The interviews show that this 
critique is justified: couples have a hard time learning about the rules that 
govern their relationships. However, many studies have shown that couples 
are confused even in the absence of an opt-out regime. In the end, the 
complexities of family composition will require the move to a more complex 
family law. There are ways to ameliorate the harms of confusions—and I 
suggest some of them in the Conclusion. But confusion cannot serve as a 
justification that outweighs all other considerations.   
C. Cohabitation as Privatization 
In recent years, privatization of dependency emerged as a major critique 
 
207 Wax, supra note 90, at 1012 (“The alternatives to marriage create a plethora of choices and 
uncertainties. The understandings, roles, and duties that attend the myriad liaisons short of marriage are 
murky, confused, conflicting, and poorly defined.”).  
 
110 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1 
 
of the role of marriage and of family law institutions more generally. 
Scholars have pointed out that privatization of support is one of the 
keystones of family law in the United States.208 A primary function of family 
law is to free the state from the burden of supporting dependent members of 
society. The state “recognizes and bestows benefits on families so that they 
will serve a private welfare function, minimizing reliance on state and 
federal coffers.”209 Although the private welfare function is rarely discussed 
as an impetus for an opt-out regime, this objective is discernable in adopting 
such a regime.  
Family law history in the United States is filled with steady sequences 
that enforce and expand private support obligations among intimate partners. 
For example, in the nineteenth century, common-law marriage served as a 
doctrine that “provided judges with a way to privatize the financial 
dependency of economically unstable women plaintiffs.”210 Fast forward to 
the twenty-first century, courts justifying the legalization of same-sex 
marriage in the United States also recognized the role of privatization as a 
function of marriage.211 As one New Jersey judge put it, “[m]arriage’s vital 
purpose is not to mandate procreation but to control or ameliorate its 
consequences—the so-called ‘private welfare’ purpose.”212  
From this perspective, just as in the United States, where the common-
law marriage doctrine has served to deepen the privatization of dependency, 
the Canadian context teaches the same. A famous Canadian Supreme Court 
case challenged the exclusion of unmarried couples from matrimonial 
protections as unconstitutional.213 Supreme Court Justice L’Heureux-Dubé 
dissented, contending that treating unmarried couples differently than 
married couples, in this case, is discriminatory.214 In her fierce dissent, she 
acknowledged that rules of equal division serve a “desire to avoid diverting 
funds from the public purse in order to support separated individuals.”215  
Proponents of an opt-out regime should be careful with what they wish 
for. There is no question that the opt-out mechanism advances the 
 
208  See Margaret Ryznar, The Odd Couple: The Estate Tax and Family Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 523, 
540 (2015) (“The traditional view of families is as economic support for its members. In fact, society 
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67 (2014). 
210 Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
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privatization of dependency, which is a prime goal of fiscal conservatives.216 
The opt-out regime might just be another step in a system that already relies 
on the families to fill in the role that the government should be taking. 
Privatizing support is part of a larger neoliberal approach that seeks to 
transfer economic risks from the collective to families themselves.217 In 
neoliberal thought, marriage serves to “impose discipline and privatize 
dependency among the poor.”218 Marriage “is a gendered institution for 
privatizing social costs—women, dependent on husbands or the low-wage 
job market, must bear responsibility for child care costs.”219 The ideology 
that the married family is at the center of society, and is the primary unit for 
support in time of economic crises, sends a signal that it is the spouses’ role 
to take care of one another.  
The implications of an opt-out regime—besides the obvious care for the 
economically vulnerable partner—is the continuance of an ideology that 
relies on individuals to care for basic needs. Privatization results in increased 
inequality in life chances between those who can afford to raise a family and 
those who cannot.220 Further, in the United States, where a large percentage 
of cohabiting couples have low income and wealth, the privatization aspect 
is even more noticeable and impactful. The state has long tried to deal with 
poverty by increasing marriage rates.221 Moving to increase marriage rates 
via recognition of marriage-like relationships might just be another 
incarnation of marriage promotion policy. Moreover, low-income couples 
who rely on state-welfare support would lose some income-based subsidies 
because of such recognition.   
In summary, in the absence of measures to assist couples in making an 
active choice and considering the stickiness of default rules and of couples’ 
cognitive biases against arranging their obligations, the channeling function 
of the rule-based approach promotes privatization and commitment. The law 
assumes couples are altruistic: they share everything.222 Contracting out of 
 
216 Brenda Cossman observes that in the U.S., there are three (sometimes conflicting) influential 
conservative values: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism, and social conservatism. In general, Cossman 
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altruism is difficult. Additionally, the law’s choices are quite limited. The 
law nudges couples into one of four options: be single, be married by default, 
or be married with formalities. The fourth option—shaping one’s unique 
preferences—becomes costly and difficult to accomplish. 
CONCLUSION 
It has become a cliché to state that family structure has changed, and the 
law has not kept pace. But it is clear that, with the rise in the number of 
informal relationships, the status quo cannot remain for long. When 
choosing how to address the regulatory design, opt-out regimes can and 
should remain on the table as one strategy. Nonetheless, BC teaches a critical 
lesson about the common complications that are involved in implementing 
such a regime. Below, I offer what potential pitfalls to avoid and some 
strategies on how to do so. I do not aim to present an exhaustive list and 
analysis, simply to point to main topics, with some initial thoughts on 
refraining from repeating BC’s mistakes.  
A primary problem with an opt-out regime is that people do not know 
about the law. This is not a drawback unique to this area: transparency and 
publicity of default legal regimes can make the difference between enabling 
choice and mandating one.223 A few simple steps can make the law more 
transparent and known, and thus more effective and just. For instance, one 
interviewee suggested that lease agreements (the templates themselves) 
should contain some disclosure about the law. It makes sense because, while 
some partners move into the other partner’s or partners’ home, a substantial 
percentage of couples move together into a new apartment. This is a 
worthwhile way, with minimal regulatory costs, to make couples aware of 
the defaults that are likely to govern their relationship. Notifying a couple 
when they have reached their two-year mark, to the extent the government 
knows about it (for example, because the couple file taxes together), would 
likewise not require too great an administrative burden.  
Of course, the more the default law is known, the stronger its 
constitutive effect will be. Thus, couples’ knowledge alone would be an 
advance, but their knowledge alone is insufficient. Hence, considering the 
impact that the law governing informal relationships has, a less ascriptive 
mechanism might include (at least) an easier way to opt out. I can imagine 
various ways to channel couples to deliberate and make an informed choice 
about their mutual financial obligations. As one example, individuals in BC 
who want to notify the relevant parties where their latest will is simply fill 
in an online form and pay $17 to register their will.224 An equivalent 
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mechanism that enables couples to alter the defaults that govern their 
relationships does not exist.   
The heterogeneity of experiences the couples in this study exhibited, 
along with other studies confirming cohabitation as a diverse practice, lead 
to the understanding that one-size-fits-all is not going to work in this area. 
Hence, one option is to formulate customized default rules that function 
differently according to typical common grounds among types of 
partnerships. Just as default rules for investing retirement funds change 
according to age (younger age: riskier track; older: more solid), the law can 
tailor defaults based on the partnership type. As an example: for the elderly, 
no automatic equal division, and just the opposite for people in long-term 
first relationships. Such a regime can make the law more complicated; 
however, relationships are complex, and one default will rarely fit all. 
Another possibility, as I suggest elsewhere, is creating a registration scheme 
that is functional enough to accommodate the needs of various types of 
relationships (not merely marriage-by-a-different-name).225 A registration 
scheme would be flexible and would also enable conjugal and nonconjugal 
partners to designate their partner as a beneficiary for various 
circumstances.226 Yet, under BC’s opt-out model, where marital benefits and 
duties are automatically assigned, few couples would have an incentive to 
use such registration.  
The bottom line is that more innovative and systematic thinking is 
required. An effective plan cannot isolate one part of the menu of options 
but will look at the entire system together. Reform must envision a 
comprehensive plan and policy recommendations for a set of legal 
institutions—a menu of options for legal recognition of relationships—that 
work in harmony, increase choice, and reflect the reality of family life in the 
twenty-first century. Fragmentation, such as focusing only on the rules of 
contracts between unmarried couples, without thinking about the default 
rules of division of properties and support, is doomed to fail. This is because 
the other institutions of family law also affect the lives of unmarried couples. 
Thus, construing rules of recognition without contemplating which rules of 
division should apply, or what rules for contract formation and opting out 
are enforceable, will soon face problems.  
While it is not what the law’s promoters had hoped for, the good news 
is that the outcomes have been, for the most part, less dramatic than both 
sides of the debate imagined. Of course, since this study was limited to 
young adults, mainly educated and often childless, to better assess the 
regime, we ought to learn the effects the law has on other groups of 
cohabitants. Both supporters and critics should contend with how the law 
 
225 See Aloni, supra note 43, at 607–31 (proposing a “registered contractual relationships” scheme 
founded on contracts and providing for maximum flexibility).  
226 See generally Eskridge Jr., supra note 5, at 1965 (discussing the possible configuration of menus 
and their utility for nonconjugal partners).  
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has spread conjugality, bringing in traditionalism through the back door. 
Indeed, on the whole, it is a regime of compulsory conjugality—as most 
partners will find themselves married by default. For some, that will be good 
news; for others, proof of the extent to which marriage is the core institution 
in whose likeness other institutions are created. The opt-out regime also 
promotes privatization of dependency, an already well-entrenched function 
of family law and policy. Some might find this positive, but progressives 
who support an opt-out regime must engage with the fact that it is a major 
impetus and a significant result of the scheme.   
In any event, BC’s experiment with an opt-out regime, even if not the 
success that many wished, helps scholars and policymakers to better 
understand how to shape a law responsive to the reality of diverse family 
structures. It will assist in crafting the next type of regulatory regime. It is 
better than stagnation. Now it is the job of family law commentators, 
policymakers, and legislators to take this to the next stage. 
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# Ages Occupations Ethnicity (self-described)  
1 21 and 21 Works at a non-profit/Software 
developer 
Canadian/White  
Caucasian/Canadian  2 27 and 26 Bik  workshop coordinator/Carpenter Jewish/Not state  
3 32 and 31 Chemistry instructor/Unemployed Scottish/White Italian 
4 28 and 29 Graduate student/Hotel manager Brazilian/Not stated 
5 43 and 48 Midwife/Accountant White/White 
6 36 and 35 Legal assistant/Software engineer Canadian White/Western 
European 7 27 and 29 Dietician/Computer engineer Indian Fijian/Indian Fijian  
8 37 and 40 Software sales rep/Chiropractor   French Canadian/Canadian 
9 30 and 42 Unemployed/Entrepreneur White/White 
10 29 and 30 Small-business owners (both) English Canadian/Caucasian 
Australian 11 23 and 25 Urban farmer/Recent graduate Caucasia /Caucasian 
12 29 and 33 Engineer/Engineer White/Canadian 
13 31 and 31 Mortgage broker/General manager White/White 
14 28 and 33 Marketing/Technician Canadian/Canadian 
16 32 and 35 Student/Service manager Caucasian/White 
17 28 and 30 High school teacher/Social worker 
assistant 
Caucasian/Caucasian 
18 30 and 29 Events coordinator/e-Commerce White/Caucasian 
19 30 and 31 Counsellor/Medical writer Javanese Muslim/Jewish 
Canadian 20 32 and 38 Electrician/Sprinkler fitter White/White 
21 32 and 27 Art teacher/Disability White Canadian/White 
Canadian 22 36 and 43 PhD student/Communications White/Serbian 
23 27 and 28 Visual artist/Applications support 
engineer 
White/White 
24 28 and 27 Property manager/Project coordinator White/Métis 
25 29 and 28 Lawyer/Teacher Jewish/Jewish 
26 33 and 35 Occupational therapist/Labour contract 
negotiator 
White/White 
27 26 and 29 Banker/Executive Chinese/German 
28 30 and 31 Brewery worker/Landscaper Canadian/Canadian 
29 30 and 29 Actor/Writer White/White 
30 33 and 44 Social Worker/Data manager White Australian/White 
European 

 
 
 
